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Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General
Deliberative Privileget
GERALD WETLAUFER*
The general deliberative privilege' is relatively new2 to the list of eviden-
tiary privileges that the federal executive may assert in the course of judicial
proceedings. 3 It is a qualified privilege under which the executive is now
t @ Copyright 1990 by Gerald Wetlaufer.
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. J.D., 1972, Yale University;
A.B., 1967, Princeton University. I wish to express my particular thanks to David C. Baldus,
Arthur E. Bonfield, William G. Buss, Mary Louise Fellows, Duncan Kennedy, Richard A.
Matasar, and Peter M. Shane for their generous criticisms of earlier drafts of this Article.
1. This doctrine has a number of different names. It has sometimes been treated as an
undifferentiated part of a larger cluster of privileges, usually either the "executive privilege,"
see, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 791, 797 (Cust. Ct. 1979) or the "official
information privilege," see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 509, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1972) (rejected by
Congress in 1973). It has also been identified as the "pre-decisional privilege," Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414, 416 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (Mobil Oil I1), the
"deliberative process privilege," Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d
768, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the "advice" privilege, A. BREcKmimrE, TBE ExacuTrva PRVmEGE
155 (1974), the privilege for "intragovernmental communications," In re Franklin Nat'l Bank
Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the privilege for "intragovernmental
documents," SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 797, the privilege for "intra-agency advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations," Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1014-15
(D. Del. 1975), and, most elaborately, the privilege for "intra-governmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions are formulated," Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 462 F.
Supp. 966, 971 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
2. See, e.g., McCoRMICK ON EvmENCE § 108, at 265-67 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) ("the
privilege is newly emergent"); infra notes 38-123 and accompanying text.
3. A great deal of confusion surrounds the general deliberative privilege by virtue of our
failure to draw clear distinctions between, first, those "judicial" privileges that the executive
may interpose as limitations upon the powers or actions of the judiciary and, second, those
other and sometimes related privileges that it may assert against the Congress. See, e.g., R.
BERGER, ExEcrnvE PivaomaE (1978) (deals primarily with the assertion of executive privilege
as against Congress and not with questions of judicial privilege). Further confusion arises
from our failure to draw clear distinctions among various forms of judicial privilege available
to the federal executive.
Apart from the general deliberative privilege, see infra note 10, the particular judicial
privileges that are available to the federal executive but are unavailable to private litigants
include:
(1) The privilege protecting state, military and diplomatic secrets. New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1 (1953); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948) (intelligence sources secret); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1936); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (no
suit on government contract with spy); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (absolute privilege sustained by then circuit judge Scalia); Halkin v. Helms,
598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (privilege asserted in suit over illegal surveillance);
see also Fed. R. Evid. 509, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1972) (rejected by Congress
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routinely excused from the obligation to disclose, in civil litigation, the
1973); R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 216-24 (1974); 2 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 226 (1985); McCoRMCK, supra note 2, § 107; 2
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEiNsTEIN's EVIDENCE 509[01], 509[03] (1989); 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2378, at 794 (J. McNaughton Rev. 1961); 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019, at 159-60 & n.82
(1970); Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 480-82 (1957).
(2) The privilege protecting the identity of certain voluntary informers. McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957);
Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (agencies rely on informers);
United States v. Hemphill, 369 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1966) (defendant employer
sought names of complainants in Department of Labor fair pay case); Wirtz v.
BAC Steel Prods., Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962) (same); Mitchell v. Roma,
265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959) (same); see also R. BERGER, supra, at 224-26; 2 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra, §§ 235-236; MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 111;
2 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, 1 510[01]-510[08]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra, at 155-58; Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications,
98 HAgv. L. REv. 1450, 1595-1600 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communica-
tions]; McKay, The Right to Confrontation, 1959 WAsH. U.L.Q. 122, 145-60
(arguing that secrecy may not be essential to inducing informers to come forward).
(3) The privilege protecting presidential deliberations. Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
see also A. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 1 (dealing with power of the President to
withhold information from Congress); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra, §
234; McCoRaMCK, supra note 2, § 108, at 264-65; Cox, Executive Privilege, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1407-17, 1434-35 (1974); Freund, Foreword: On Presidential
Privilege, 88 HAxv. L. REv. 13 (1974); United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (1974); United States v. Nixon: An Historical Perspective, 9 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 11 (1974).
(4) The privilege protecting quasi-judicial deliberations of high executive offi-
cials. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan 11); Cox, supra, at 1417-18. Though there seems to
be no question concerning the availability of this privilege, none of the basic
evidence treatises contain any consideration of it. It is, however, in all the basic
works dealing with administrative law.
(5) The privilege protecting information related to ongoing criminal, civil and
administrative investigations. Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738
F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. O'Neill, 619 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.
1980); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Freeman,
405 F.2d at 1326; Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th
Cir. 1966); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961) (discovery
sought by defendant in an action brought by the government); see also R.
BERGER, supra, 227-28; 2 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra, §§ 228, 230;
MCCORMCK, supra note 2, § 108, at 265-67 (law enforcement investigational
files); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, 509[51]-509158]; Note, Discovery
of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 CoLtrM. L.
REv. 142, 157-62 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Discovery].
(6) The privilege protecting information that is subject to a statutory prohibition
against disclosure or publication. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 41 F.R.D. 266 (D.N.D. 1966); Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684
(N.D. Ill. 1965); see also R. BERGER, supra, at 228-30; McCoMIcK, supra note
2, § 112 (statutory privileges for certain reports of ifidividuals to government
agencies); 2 J. WEi NsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, 501141]-501[46]; 8 C. WRIGHT
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advice, opinions and recommendations that are communicated during a
deliberation that leads to the making of any decision within the executive
branch. The privilege is "general" in that it is not confined, as are two of
its close relatives, either to presidential deliberations4 or to the "quasi-
judicial" deliberations of high executive officials.' The underlying rationale
is that disclosure of deliberative communications wil chill future commu-
nications, thus diminishing the effectiveness of executive decisionmaking
and injuring the public interest. It has also been justified by reference to
various bodies of authority including the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
& A. MILLER, supra, at 160-64; Note, Discovery, supra, at 149-56.
In addition, there are other privileges, all less well established, that have been said to be
available to the federal executive:
(1) The privilege protecting information that is or may once have been subject
to protection under the now-weakened Housekeeping Act. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988);
United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v. Comingore,
177 U.S. 459 (1900); R. BERGER, supra, at 230; H. CRoss, THE PEoPLE's RIGHT
To KNow 214-22 (1953); McCoixncK, supra note 2, § 108, at 264-65; 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MMER, supra, at 165-66; Bishop, supra, at 478-80; Carrow,
Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. Ray. 166
(1958); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879, 881-
82, 887 (1962); Miller, Availability and Use of Non-Public Government Records
and Reports in Civil Litigation, 9 SYRAcusE L. REv. 163 (1958); Mitchell,
Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice: Rules and Regulations as an
Autonomous Screen, 58 COLTJM. L. REy. 199 (1958); Note, Discovery, supra, at
142, 145-49; Note, Discovery from the United States in Suits between Private
Litigants-the 1958 Amendment of the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 69 YALE
L.J. 452 [hereinafter Note, Private Litigants]; Note, Discovery of Government
Documents under the Federal Rules, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 122 (1950); Note, The
Extent of Governmental Immunity from Federal Rule 34, 41 VA. L. REv. 507
(1955); Note, Government Privilege Against Disclosure of Official Documents,
58 YALE L.J. 993 (1949).
(2) The privilege protecting information which would, if prematurely disclosed,
significantly diminish the executive's ability to engage in some planned transaction.
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953); United
States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (claim based on
housekeeping regulation); see also Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
(3) The privilege protecting information that has been communicated to the
government under promises or expectations of confidentiality. Machin v. Zuckert,
316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
The executive, like other litigants, also enjoys privileges that include the attorney-client
relationship and the attorney's work-product protection. FED. R. Crv. P. 26; 8 C. WRiGHT &
A. Mnmm, supra, § 2017 (attorney-client privilege), §§ 2021-2028 (work-product protection).
But see Barsdate, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YArE L.J. 1725
(1988).
Also, prior to 1970, the government, like others, enjoyed the protection-barely distinguish-
able from that of a qualified privilege-of the rule that allowed document discovery only on
a showing of "good cause." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MHI.ER, supra, §§ 2201, 2205.
4. See the executive privilege protecting presidential deliberations described supra note 3.
5. See supra note 3.
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the separation of powers, the rule that is known to administrative lawyers
as the Morgan doctrine, 6 the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).
The privilege was first adopted by a federal court in Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. United States,7 a 1958 Court of Claims decision. Although
the privilege has been approved by neither the Congress nor the Supreme
Court," it has taken strong hold in the general federal courts9 and has been
applied in a large and growing number of cases.' 0 As an evidentiary privilege
available to the executive, it has also been applied through the case law
that has developed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)."
6. See infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
7. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958); see infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 38-148 and accompanying text; notes 184-253 and accompanying text.
9. I mean by this term to identify the courts of general federal jurisdiction, thus including
the district courts and the courts of appeals but not the Court of Claims.
10. E.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981); McClelland v. Andrus, 606
F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); ISI Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.
1974); Freeman, 405 F.2d at 1326; Olson Rug Co., 291 F.2d at 655; Spell v. McDaniel, 591
F. Supp. 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 418
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Mobil Oil 1, 520 F. Supp. at 414; Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 577; SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp.
at 791; Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 1316 (Cust. Ct. 1979);
Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 966; EEOC v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 1373 (D.N.M. 1974); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974)
(Black 1); Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 939; Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55
F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 52 F.R.D. 14 (D. Minn.
1971); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub
nom. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952
(1967). Contra Babets v. Secretary of Executive Office of Human Serv., 526 N.E.2d 1261
(Mass. 1988) (rejects privilege based on deliberative rationale, separation of powers).
Most decisions upholding the general deliberative privilege are reached during the course of
pre-trial discovery proceedings. The great bulk of such decisions are never reported. Accord-
ingly, it would seem appropriate to assume that, whatever the total number of reported
decisions, the number of unreported decisions is significantly larger. See also Fed. R. Evid.
509, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1972) (rejected by Congress in 1973); R. BERGER, supra note 3, at
231-64 (dealing with both the privilege in the courts and the privilege against Congress); 2 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, §§ 228-229; McCo~mcK, supra note 2, at 265-67
(general deliberative privilege "newly emergent"); 2 J. WEINsmTnE & M. BERGER, supra note
3, 509[05], 509[07]; 2 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, at 509-1; 8 C. WNRIGH &
A. MuIR, supra note 3, at 167-69; Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA
L. Rav. 49 (1976); Bishop, supra note 3, at 487-88; Cox, supra note 3, at 1407-14; Privileged
Communications, supra note 3, at 1611-14, 1619-23; Weaver & Jones, The Deliberative Process
Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REv. 279 (1989); Winter, The Seedlings for the Forest, 83 YALE L.J.
1730 (1974); Note, Discovery, supra note 3, at 142-43, 162-65; Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 281, 291 (1974) (reviewing R. BERGER, THE EXEcuTrvE PRIVrLEGE (1974)).
11. The Freedom of Information Act provides generally that a broad range of executive
records shall be made available to the public. Exemption five excludes from this general
obligation of disclosure those "inter-agency or intra-agency" documents which are the subject
of a judicial privilege. See infra notes 124-31, 245-53 and accompanying text.
Cases in which the general deliberative privilege is applied by virtue of its incorporation into
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This Article addresses the question of whether there ought to be a general
deliberative privilege, a question assumed by many to be properly answered
in the affirmative. Part I defines the privilege and details its rationale. Part
II examines its history and thus lays a foundation for its assessment. Part
III then addresses the question of whether the privilege is warranted. It
deals with the allocation of the burden of persuasion in arguments of this
kind, with the full range of relevant real-world effects, and with the
arguments from legal authority that have been offered in support of the
privilege.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, I conclude that this privilege simply
ought not exist. I believe this conclusion is supported by the history of the
privilege, the law assigning the burden of persuasion to the proponents of
a judicial privilege, the weakness of the instrumental and doctrinal arguments
in favor of the privilege, and the availability of alternatives to the privilege
that will satisfy its purposes at lower cost to the public interest. Though
my arguments are not exotic, most of them have not been applied previously
to the general deliberative privilege. Once applied, I find that they lead to
an unconventional conclusion.
I. THE PRVILEGE, ITS RATIONALE AND ITS DIMENSIONS
The general deliberative privilege is a privilege that is best defined in
terms of its rationale. That rationale is the instrumental claim that secrecy
is necessary to candor, that candor is necessary to effective decisionmaking
by the executive, and that enhancing the effectiveness of executive decision-
making serves the public interest. Accordingly, the establishment of a general
deliberative privilege is warranted because it promotes the public interest.
Thus, one court has observed that "[f]reedom of communication vital to
[the] fulfillment of the aims of wholesome relationships is obtained only by
removing the specter of compelled disclosure" and that the "government
... needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is
exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act include: Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 768; Dudman
Communications Corp. v. Department of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Taxation
with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Califano, 623 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); Coastal States Gas v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d
854 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. -1980); Lead
Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 511
F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 519 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Montrose Chem. v. Train,
491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 438 F.2d
1349 (2d Cir. 1971); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Green v. IRS, 556 F.
Supp. 79 (N.D. Ind. 1982), aff'd mem., 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984).
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essential to the quality of its functioning.' 12 Other courts tell us that the
'purpose of [the] privilege is to foster freedom of expression among
governmental employees involved in decision making and policy
formulation''13 and to facilitate "candid and confidential internal debate"
within the government.' 4 The operating assumption is that "effective and
efficient governmental decision making requires a free flow of ideas among
government officials and that inhibitions will result if officials know that
their communications may be revealed to outsiders.' '1 5 Often described in
terms of a desire to prevent the "chilling" of deliberative communications,
one recognizes and is disposed to accept this rationale because claims of
this kind underlie a wide range of well-established privileges 6 and are
legitimate, important elements of first amendment jurisprudence. 7
Apart from this argument based on instrumental effects, some courts
have also found justification for the existence of the privilege in arguments
based on legal authority." Such arguments have been based upon: the
powers granted the executive under article II of the Constitution, the
12. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd
sub noma. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 952 (1967). This language has been widely quoted and appears here in essentially the
form in which it was quoted in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 n.17 (1974) (Nixon
I).
The omission marked by the ellipsis between "government" and "needs open but protected
channels" is worthy of note. The unedited language of the Zeiss decision argues that "gov-
ernment, no less than the citizen, needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk
that is essential to the quality of its functioning." Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 325. While
citizens share with the government a number of evidentiary privileges that are clearly intended
to protect a certain relationship (e.g., the relationship between an attorney and her client), the
general deliberative rationale has been invoked for the benefit of governmental organizations,
but never for the benefit of any private organization comprised of "mere" citizens, no matter
how important or noble their purpose.
13. McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
14. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
15. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see
e.g., 2 J. WEnNSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, §§ 509-34 - 509-38, 509-48 - 509-52; 8 C.
WRoH & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 167-69; Weaver & Jones, supra note 10, at 279;
Privileged Communications, supra note 3, at 1611-14, 1619-23; Note, Discovery, supra note
3, at 142-43, 162-65.
16. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (grand jury
proceedings); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (physician-patient privilege); Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (votes and deliberations of petit juries); McCoxwicK,
supra note 2, at 212; 8 WboMoam supra note 3, § 2291 (attorney-client privilege).
While assertions concerning chilling effects help to support certain existing privileges, such
assertions-even when plausible-do not assure the establishment of a judicial privilege. See,
e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (no privilege for peer review materials
related to tenure decisions); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 706 (1972) (no privilege protecting
"confidential" communications between a news source and a reporter).
17. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 166-67.
18. Apart from arguments from instrumental effects and arguments from controlling legal
authority, privileges sometimes rest on protectable interests in privacy. Such arguments have
not been advanced in support of the general deliberative privilege.
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separation of powers doctrine, the Morgan doctrine which protects the
thought processes of high executive officials performing quasi-judicial func-
tions, the Freedom of Information Act and cases decided under that statute,
and proposed-but ultimately rejected-rule 509 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Other such arguments have been based upon precedent in the
British House of Lords, in the United States Court of Claims, or, as the
number of such cases has grown, in the general federal courts.
Beyond the question of the basic justification for the privilege, the
courts have also specified the scope of the privilege both in terms of
the communications that it covers and the litigation circumstances in
which it may be raised. Generally, the privilege extends to written and
oral communications 19 comprised of opinions, recommendations or ad-
vice offered in the course of the executive's decisionmaking processes. 20
It does not cover, however, communications of fact, 2' communications
19. The great majority of decisions involving the general deliberative privilege involve the
production of documents. The privilege also extends, however, to the provision of live
testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 123 F.R.D. 3 (1988)
(decision of a special master).
20. Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Branch
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1981); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano,
623 F.2d 1, 5-6 (6th Cir. 1980); Coastal States Gas v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
886 (D.C. Cir. 1980); McClelland, 606 F.2d at 1287; ISI Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d
558, 589 (9th Cir. 1974); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 84-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982), aff'd mem.,
734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 581, 585, 588; Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Simons-Eastern Co.
v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 324; see
also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (FOIA exemption five).
Also bearing upon the scope of the privilege, my research has revealed no case in which the
executive has sought, successfully or unsuccessfully, to secure judicial protection against the
disclosure of such deliberative communications by third parties who are not, at the time
disclosure is threatened, within the executive branch. The executive did, however, seek and
nearly secure such a right in connection with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
21. Branch, 638 F.2d at 882; McClelland, 606 F.2d at 1287; Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d
336, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall,
280 F.2d 654, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1960); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 581-82 and cases cited
therein (Privilege does not extend to facts or to material that is "primarily reportorial and
expository, not deliberative"; generally "the lower the level of abstraction in the writing, the
less the need for the privilege."); SCM Corp. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 791, 797 (Cust.
Ct. 1979); Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 966, 974 (Cust. Ct. 1978); Smith
v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 (D. Del. 1975); EEOC v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.N.M. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 102
F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Mobil 1); Simons-Eastern Co., 55 F.R.D. at 88-89 and cases
cited therein (facts discoverable, federal agent's conclusions and opinions are privileged); Wood
v. Breief, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (no privilege where information was factual and
contained no recommendations for future action); Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 324; see
also Mink, 410 U.S. at 85-94 (FOIA exemption five); Parke, Davis & Co., 623 F.2d at 5
(FOIA); Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d at 866-69 (FOIA); Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303,
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FOIA); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
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of final decisions 2 or communications that are post-decisional.Y As to the
circumstances in which it may be asserted, some courts have held that the
privilege has been waived when the discovery is sought in connection with
the defense of a civil suit brought by the government.? Similarly, many
courts have found an exception to the privilege in cases involving allegations
of governmental misconduct or, more recently, of serious governmental
mistake.?
The courts have also established a set of procedures that the executive
must follow in asserting the privilege. First, the privilege must be asserted
(FOIA); Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (FOIA).
The rule that opinions are subject to protection while facts are not seems to rest on two
assumptions. The first is that the communication of opinions can be chilled but that the
communication of facts cannot. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 582 (disclosure of
facts would not "hinder the free flow of advice in government"); see also Mink, 410 U.S. at
88-89, 91 (FOIA); Machin, 316 F.2d at 40; Boeing Airplane Co., 280 F.2d at 660-61. The
second is that "facts" are important to litigation and that "opinions" are not. Neither of
these assumptions appears to be warranted. They also assume an ability to distinguish "fact"
from "opinion" that is, at the very least, problematic. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp.
at 583-84.
22. Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 815, 818 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FOIA
request for purposes of discovery), reh'g denied, 519 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1975):
[The policy of promoting the free flow of ideas ... does not apply here, for private
transmittals of binding agency opinions and interpretations should not be encouraged.
These are not the ideas and theories which go into the making of the law, they are
the law itself, and as such should be made available to the public.
Id. (quoting Sterling Drug v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
23. Taxation with Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 677-78; Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d
at 866; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Mobil II); Cliff, 496 F. Supp. at 575; Pilar v. S.S. Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1972)
(suit for damages from shipboard fire; subpoena to non-party federal agency; discovery
permitted as to the agency's official conclusions; individual conclusions lnd departmental
conclusions privileged); Wood, 54 F.R.D. at 10-12 (no privilege where there is no recommen-
dation for future action); Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 324 (material "comprising part of
a process by which governmental degisions and policies are formulated"); see also NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 & n.19 (1975) (FOIA exemption five).
24. Los Alamos Constructors, 382 F. Supp. at 1379-84 and cases cited therein (series of
strident statements to the effect that government cannot bring civil suit and withhold infor-
mation useful to the defense); FDIC v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 260,
262 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (government cannot invoke the privilege because it initiated the lawsuit).
These decisions are all modeled, more or less explicitly, on Judge Hand's decisions involving
the government's waiver when it was in the position of being a prosecutor in a criminal action.
United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
25. In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 582, 587 (protecting evidence of governmental wrong-
doing does not enhance the effectiveness of government and is therefore not within the scope
of the general deliberative privilege; "an element of unfairness would enter" if government
could conceal evidence "behind the screen" of privilege); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am.,
371 F. Supp. 97, 101-02 (D.D.C. 1974) (Black 1); Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp.
394, 401-03 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Dearborn v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967); Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 329; Rosee v. Board of
Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 690 (N.D. Il. 1965); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D.
485 (D.C.N.J. 1960); Note, Discovery, supra note 3, at 143-44.
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by the head of an executive agency who must base his claim on his personal
assessment of the documents in question. 6 Second, the claim of privilege
must include a specific and particularized description of the documents that
the executive seeks to withhold. 27 Third, the executive must provide a clear
statement of the need for confidentiality. 28 Should the government fail to
meet any of these procedural prerequisites, some courts have simply con-
cluded that the privilege has not been properly claimed and therefore cannot
be granted. 29
Finally, the courts have developed a set of rules concerning the decisional
process to be followed once the privilege has been asserted. At the threshold,
it is established that the privilege is qualified,1° that it is for the courts to
decide whether it applies in a particular case, 31 that, at least in theory, the
burden is on the government to prove that it ought to be applied in the
particular case, 32 and that in making its decision the court may, if circum-
26. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (military secret); McClelland, 606
F.2d at 1290 n.59; Mobil Oil 11, 520 F. Supp. at 416 (agency head may delegate responsibility
if properly done); SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 796-97; Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at
969 (head of agency); Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1016; United States v. O'Neill, 81 F.R.D. 664,
666 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (attorney's oral assertion insufficient), vacated, 619 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.
1980); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins., 53 F.R.D. at 262 n.2 (privilege unavailable because not
properly invoked); see also Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (state secret;
Reynolds procedures required); Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336,
1341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (investigative files; lawyer's generalized claim insufficient; Reynolds
procedures required); Black 1, 371 F. Supp. at 101 (investigative files).
27. Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 416; Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 970; Smith,
403 F. Supp. at 1016; Black 1, 371 F. Supp. at 101 (proper claim of privilege requires "a
specific designation and description of the documents" because otherwise "it is impossible for
a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected");
see also Eilsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (privilege for state secrets;
privilege should be justified in as much detail as possible without undermining the privilege),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
28. Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 416; Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1016 ("there must be a
demonstration of 'precise and certain reasons for preserving' the confidentiality of the gov-
ernmental communications"); Black I, 371 F. Supp. at 101 (proper claim of privilege requires
a statement of "precise and certain reasons for preserving confidentiality"); see also Black v.
Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Black I) (investigative files).
29. Black I, 371 F. Supp. at 101.
30. Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 417; In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 582; SCM Corp.,
473 F. Supp. at 797 ("courts must weigh the need for the materials sought against the potential
harm that would result from their disclosure"); Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 974;
Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1015; Black I, 371 F. Supp. at 100; Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp.
at 946; Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 327; see also Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 711-12 (presidential
deliberative privilege). But see Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(treating privilege as absolute).
31. Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 969 and cases cited therein ("there is no question
that the judiciary has the power to" decide whether the documents may be withheld).
32. There seems never to have been any doubt that, at least in theory, the burden is on
the government to demonstrate that particular documents come within the scope of the general
deliberative privilege. Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d at 868 (FOIA); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F.
Supp. 1090, 1116 (E.D.N.C. 1984) ("The law will sustain a claim of privilege only when
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stances warrant, inspect the documents in camera. 3
absolutely necessary to protect and preserve an interest of significant public importance that
the asserted privilege is designed to serve."); Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 416 ("Mhe
government has the burden of proof on the applicability of the pre-decisional privilege.");
Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1016; Los Alamos Constructors, 382 F. Supp. at 1375 ("[B]ureaucrats
cannot hide behind a privilege claim unless.., an overwhelming public interest demands
[secrecy].... [A] recognition of governmental privilege is the rare exception, while full
disclosure is the almost universal rule."); see also Gulf Oil v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913,
917 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (attorney-client privilege); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025
(D. Md. 1976) (legislative privilege).
There have, nevertheless, been a great many cases that have in fact placed the burden of
persuasion on the party seeking discovery. Some of these are perfectly appropriate because
they arose prior to 1970, when the proponent of document discovery was entitled to discovery
only on an affirmative showing of "good cause." In these cases, the burden was on the
proponent of discovery even before the privilege was asserted.
But even after the "good cause" rule was eliminated in 1970, a significant number of cases
have assigned the burden of persuasion to the party seeking the assertedly deliberative material.
Thus, Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1016, clearly acknowledges that "[a]s with any privilege the
burden is upon the claimant of executive privilege to demonstrate a proper entitlement to
exemption from disclosure." Id. But when the court actually struck the balance to decide
whether to sustain the claim of privilege, it did so in terms of the "showing necessary to
surmount a governmental claim of privilege." Further, it indicated that a litigant must show
a 'pressing need' ...in order to overcome a properly raised claim of executive privilege."
Id. at 1015 n.46 (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 332
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
Similarly, in SCM Corp., the court announced that the government's interest in candid
conversation generally "take[s] precedence" over the interests of the litigant seeking discovery;
thus, that litigant must demonstrate a specific need for the documents that is "clear,"
"persuasive" and "compelling." SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 798-99 (quoting SEC v. Bausch
& Lomb Co., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). Again, in Carl Zeiss
Stiftung, the court held that the government's interest in candor is the "preponderating policy"
and that, prior to considering specific questions of application, we have already "str[uck] the
balance in favor of nondisclosure .... Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 324; see also
Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 974, 976; EW Bliss Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp.
175, 176 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (quoting J. MooRE, J. LucAs & 0. GROTHBR, MOO.E's FDERA.L
PRacncE 26.61[6.-4] (2d ed. 1989), to the effect that information should be disclosed unless
"the court is satisfied that it would be against public policy to do so," but then explaining
that "in all but exceptional cases it is considered against the public interest to compel the
government to produce inter-agency advisory opinions."); Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at
947.
33. "[C]ourts frequently examine documents in camera in order to determine whether they
should be held in a confidential status or be disclosed to the party seeking production."
Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 974, 976 and cases cited therein; In re Franklin, 478 F.
Supp. at 582.
Some courts, however, have imposed significant restrictions on the availability of in camera
inspections on the ground that the occasional disclosure of documents in the course of litigation
will offend the policies underlying the privilege, even when the disclosure is to a single federal
judge sitting in chambers. SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 798 (inspection would constitute an
improper probing of the executive's "mental processes"); Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at
947 ("the very purpose of the privilege, the encouragement of open expression of opinion as
to governmental policy is somewhat impaired" by in camera inspection); see also Mink, 410
U.S. at 92-94 (FOIA; candid communication is "somewhat impaired" by in camera inspection).
But see Nixon , 418 U.S. at 706 (presidential deliberative privilege; confidentiality is not
diminished by in camera inspection).
The courts that have limited the availability of in camera inspections have sometimes done
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As to the substantive content of their decisions, the courts have claimed
to engage in a balancing process that takes account of relevant factors and
interests. While it has become customary to recite a list of five such factors,3 4
they may be better understood as three. The first is the discovering party's
need for the evidence. 5 The second is the perceived risk that the disclosure
of the documents in question will chill future communications.36 The third
is the belief-also reflected in the rules governing the scope of the privilege-
that at some point the government ought not be permitted to hide its own
misconduct behind a claim of executive privilege.37
so by requiring that some showing of need be made before the court will inspect the subject
documents. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 947 (party seeking discovery failed to make a
"definite showing ... of facts indicating reasonable cause" for in camera inspection); Carl
Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32; cf. Smith, 403 F. Supp. at 1015 (investigative file; a
showing of "relevance" satisfies the requirement for a "preliminary showing of necessity"
prior to in camera inspection).
Other courts that have limited the availability of in camera inspections have done so by
drawing distinctions as to the purpose of the inspection. Thus, some courts will specifically
decline to inspect documents to verify the claims made by the executive in the course of
asserting the privilege. Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 978; Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D.
at 331-32. Others have indicated a willingness to inspect documents but only after they have
somehow been persuaded that the documents include material that ought to be disclosed and
then only for the purpose of separating the material that ought to be disclosed from the
material that ought not. SCM Corp., 473 F. Supp. at 799; Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v.
United States, 463 F. Supp. 1316 (Cust. Ct. 1979); Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 978;
Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32.
As far as I can tell, all of these restrictions on the availability of in camera inspections
represent unwarranted spillovers from Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1. Reynolds involved military
secrets of state and, under those circumstances, the Court expressed reservations about the
appropriateness of in camera disclosure. There is no reason to believe that any such reservations
are appropriate when the government asserts the general deliberative privilege.
34. The factors are enumerated in In re Franklin as follows:
In this balancing of competing interests, some of the factors that assume signif-
icance are (i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the
availability of other evidence; (ii) the "seriousness" of the litigation and the
issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in the litigation; and (v) the
possibility of future timidity by government employees who will be forced to
recognize that their secrets are violable.
In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 583 (citations omitted).
35. The courts' concern for the discovering party's need for the evidence in question is
sometimes expressed directly and sometimes through attention to the relevance of the evidence
in question or to the availability of similar evidence from other sources. Mobil Oil II, 520 F.
Supp. at 417 (taking account of relevance, individual's need, availability of evidence elsewhere);
In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 582-83, 586 (taking account of relevance, individual's need,
availability of evidence elsewhere); Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 974; Black I, 371 F.
Supp. at 100 (weighing the "individual's need for disclosure of particular information");
United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 52 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D. Minn. 1971) (individual's need);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 331 (availability of evidence from other sources).
36. Mobil Oil H, 520 F. Supp. at 416-17; In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 580-83; Sprague
Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 974; Black 1, 371 F. Supp. at 100 (weighing "the public's interest
in preserving confidentiality to promote open communication necessary for an orderly func-
tioning of the government").
37. Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 417, 419 ("public interest in the proper functioning" of
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In light of these rules that address the scope of the privilege, the applicable
procedures, and the decisional processes, one might add to the case in favor
of the privilege the further argument that it has been carefully defined and
reasonably implemented. The scope of the privilege, for instance, is no
broader than the scope of its rationale. And the courts supervise its
implementation on a case-by-case basis. Under these circumstances, it is
unlikely that systematic injustice is being done in its name. Thus, even if
the case in favor of this privilege is not particularly strong, neither will be
the case against it.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
I begin the examination of the general deliberative privilege with the
history of its development. There are several purposes for considering this
history. It makes clear what is already known but tends to be forgotten-
that ideas, including those ideas that become embedded in legal doctrine,
are not timeless truths but are cultural artifacts. Moreover, these artifacts
have highly specific histories and contexts within which they have evolved.
They are, in this respect, contingent upon their circumstances. These cir-
cumstances include such things as the configuration of individual and
institutional interests and, it seems, the availability or non-availability of
certain kinds of questions and of certain rhetorical possibilities. This focus
upon the cultural and historical contingency of these ideas, upon the relevant
configurations of interests and rhetorical possibilities, and upon the circum-
government is "implicated" where the government "has been accused.., of mismanaging a
billion dollar governmental program that has far-reaching affects [sic] on the American
public"); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 582; Bank of Dearborn, 244 F. Supp. at 401-03;
Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 329.
This concern has sometimes been expressed in terms of the "seriousness of the litigation,"
the public interest in the accuracy of judicial determinations, and the general value of open
government. Most of the meaning of these statements appears to arise from judicial concern
that it would not be fair to allow the government to hide misconduct or to escape liability
through the invocation of the general deliberative privilege. See, e.g., Freeman, 405 F.2d at
1340 (seriousness of the litigation); Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 417 (seriousness of the
litigation, interest in the accuracy of judicial determinations; court must consider "even the
public interest in learning how effectively the government is operating" (restating In re Franklin
without the focus on bad conduct)); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 583, 586 ("foremost"
among the factors to be balanced "is the interest of the litigants, and ultimately of society,
in accurate judicial fact finding"; the seriousness of the litigation is another factor to be
balanced; there is, "in some circumstances, a public interest in opening for scrutiny the
government's decision making process.., for example where the documents sought may shed
light on the alleged government malfeasance"); Bank of Dearborn, 244 F. Supp. at 402 ("The
real public interest is not ... the agency's interest in its administration but the citizen's interest
in due process."); see also Note, Discovery, supra note 3, at 143.
The belief that the government ought not be permitted to hide its mistakes and misconduct
behind assertions of the general deliberative privilege has also found expression through a rule




stances of their conveyance from one place to another reveals much that is
interesting in its own right and much that is valuable in the assessment of
this particular body of law.
The general deliberative privilege was unknown in the United States federal
courts until 1958 and represents a body of ideas that was conveyed, first,
from the British House of Lords and from Dwight Eisenhower's principles
of military leadership to the United States Court of Claims and, then, from
the Court of Claims to the federal district courts. The federal courts'
acceptance of this privilege was part of a long-standing and multifaceted
contest between the proponents of open and closed government. The history
of that contest includes chapters devoted to the Housekeeping Act and its
amendment, the range of common law privileges available to the executive,
the contest between Dwight Eisenhower and Joseph McCarthy, the enact-
ment and implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, the struggle
over the privilege provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Watergate
break-in and the ensuing contest between Richard Nixon, the Congress, and
the courts, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the testimony of Oliver North.
This is a play in which there is a finite set of actors who have played
their parts with great consistency. The foremost of these, of course, has
been the federal executive. Other institutional actors have included the
Supreme Court, the Congress, the freedom of information movement and
the political and media interests that comprised that movement, and the
Court of Claims. The principal individual actors have been Justice Stanley
Reed, General-cum-President Dwight Eisenhower and President Richard
Nixon.
The music in this drama is provided by two competing choruses, one
singing "The Urge to Secrecy ' 3 and the other, "The Ode to Democracy
and Accountability." These choruses celebrate the competing values that
are at stake in this controversy, and they vary in their relative strength
from one time and place to another. In the broad arena of national politics,
the urge to secrecy and executive prerogative was strongest during the period
from which the general deliberative privilege emerged, a period marked by
the administrative aspirations of Roosevelt's presidency, the military contin-
38. The urge to secrecy is composed of several subordinate, themes, some of which are
sung by groups that one would not expect to find in the same chorus. On the right side of
this chorus is a group whose primary commitment is to law and order and to prosecuting the
Cold War. They are all but royalists when it comes to the prerogatives of the executive in
pursuing these objectives. On other issues they may be doctrinaire anti-statists.
The left side of the chorus is comprised of New Deal liberals who saw the enlargement of
Franklin Roosevelt's prerogatives vis-i-vis the judiciary as a prerequisite for progressive political
action. Just to the right of this group are the administrators, the managers and the policy
analysts whose primary commitment is to the possibility of the technocratic, expert management
of the public's business. These groups tend to be statist on precisely the issues that the right
side of this chorus is not-and visa versa.
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gencies of World War II, and the early period of the Cold War, the era of
the Rosenbergs, of Hiss and of Joseph McCarthy. The urge to democracy
and accountability, barely audible in national politics from the beginning
of World War II through the early 1950s, became strongest during and
after the Vietnam War and Watergate. And, of course, even within a single
period of time, the strength of these choruses has varied dramatically from
one institutional location to another-"secrecy" being strongest in the
executive and, more particularly, the national security establishment, and
"democracy and accountability" being strongest in the media and the
Congress.
A. Origins in the British House of Lords
Before 1958, the general deliberative privilege had been embraced by the
British House of Lords but had never been considered by the federal courts
of the United States. In the House of Lords, this particular Crown privilege
is found in two decisions, Smith v. East India Co. 39 in 1841 and Duncan
v. Cammell Laird & Co.4 in 1942.
Smith involved a demand for documents related to communications
between the East India Company and its government-appointed Board of
Control. After finding that these were entities that could invoke Crown
privilege (Americans would say "could invoke the privileges available to the
federal executive"), the House of Lords set out and approved what is now
recognized as the standard justification for the deliberative privilege:
Now, it is quite obvious that public policy requires... that the most
unreserved communication should take place between the East India
Company and the Board of Control, that it should be subject to no
restraints or limitations; but it is also quite obvious that if, at the suit
of a particular individual, those communications should be subject to
be produced in a Court of justice, the effect of that would be to restrain
the freedom of the communications, and to render them more cautious,
guarded, and reserved. I think, therefore, that these communications
come within that class of official communications which are privileged,
inasmuch as they cannot be subject to be communicated, without in-
fringing the policy of the Act of Parliament and without injury to the
public interests.41
Thus, in 1841, the House of Lords understood Crown privilege to protect
certain communications from disclosure on the ground that such disclosure
would inhibit candid communication and thus would injure the public
interest.
39. 41 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch. 1841).
40. [1942] App. Cas. 624.
41. Smith, 41 Eng. Rep. at 552.
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The more recent case, Duncan, was brought by survivors of the crew of
a new military submarine that sank during test dives in the first years of
World War II. The plaintiffs sought documents related to the submarine's
design and construction. The First Lord of the Admiralty refused to provide
the documents, and the House of Lords accepted his claim of privilege.
While obviously concerned with the security of military secrets during a
particularly perilous time of war, the Lords spoke in general terms about
how, in the administration of justice, "the rule that the interest of the state
must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure
it is a principle to be observed in administering justice, quite unconnected
with the interests or claims of the particular parties in litigation." 42 Though
the textual justification for this reading is weak, the Duncan decision has
subsequently been read to incorporate the deliberative rationale that was
first articulated in Smith.43
The House of Lords' opinions on the general deliberative privilege were
important in two ways to the privilege's development in the federal courts.
First, the procedures adopted by the Lords in Duncan for assertion of the
privilege were soon adopted, verbatim but without attribution, by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds." Reynolds was a 1953
case in which the Court approved an executive privilege for military secrets
of the kind that had actually been at issue in Duncan. Those procedures,
again almost verbatim, have since been incorporated into the general delib-
erative privilege as subsequently fashioned by the lower federal courts. In
addition, and on the merits of the privilege, when in 1958 the Court of
Claims adopted the general deliberative privilege and thus provided the
privilege with its first toehold in the federal system, the only judicial
authority that the court cited was the Duncan decision in the House of
Lords.
Though the United States judiciary followed the House of Lords in
adopting the general deliberative privilege, there was good reason not to
have done so. The British have historically assigned different weight than
Americans have to the various interests that bear upon this privilege-
particularly the importance of pretrial discovery and the prerogatives of the
42. Duncan, [1942] App. Cas. at 642.
43. The closest we get in Duncan to an express approval of the Smith rationale is the
descriptive statement, made in the Lord Chancellor's introduction to his opinion, that the
Crown's objection to the production of its documents:
is sometimes based upon the view that the public interest requires a particular
class of communications with, or within, a public department to be protected
from production on the ground that the candour and completeness of such
communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be disclosed in
subsequent litigation rather than on the contents of the particular document
itself.
Id. at 635. Nowhere in their decision do the Lords approve this basis for objection.
44. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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Crown. The British approach is far more favorable to this privilege than
the American approach. Thus, the proposition that "there is a general
deliberative privilege in Britain" will not support the inference that "there
ought to be such a privilege in the United States." It is, under these
circumstances, particularly ironic that at the very time the federal courts of
the United States were embracing the deliberative rationale, the House of
Lords, in 1968, reversed themselves and announced that they found the
deliberative rationale to be implausible.45
B. United States Supreme Court: Executive Privilege
Prior to 1974
Before 1958, consideration by the United States Supreme Court of matters
related to executive privilege are found in two lines of cases. The oldest of
these involved the Court's rulings on the executive's claims of power to
manage and withhold documents under the federal Housekeeping Act. The
other involved the identification of a number of narrowly defined common
law executive privileges.
1. The Housekeeping Act
The federal Housekeeping Act, passed in 1789, authorized the head of
each executive department to "prescribe regulations for ... the custody,
use, and preservation of ... records, papers, and property" appertaining
to the department. 46 For many years the executive branch had invoked this
statute as authority for issuing regulations that "centralized" in senior
agency officials all decisions related to the disclosure of documents. By such
45. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1 All E.R. 874 (H.L.), involved a police officer's request
for a routine personnel report that had led to his being fired. The local police superintendent
asserted a Crown privilege based on the general deliberative rationale and the House of Lords
took the occasion to reject the rationale in its entirety. Lord Morris asked:
Would the knowledge that there was a remote chance of possible enforced
production really affect candour? If there was knowledge that it was conceivably
possible that some person might himself see a report which was written about
him, it might well be that candour on the part of the writer of the report would
be encouraged rather than frustrated.
Id. at 891. Similarly, Lord Upjohn said "I cannot believe that any minister or any high level
military or civil servant would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views
in the course of his duty on some subject ... by the thought that his observations might one
day see the light of day." Id. at 915. Rejecting the factual premise underlying the deliberative
rationale, the Lords rejected the assertion of privilege and ordered that the personnel report
be produced. See also Williams v. Home Office, [1981] 1 All E.R. 1151 (Q.B.).
Even as they were rejecting the deliberative rationale in Conway, the Lords expressed their
readiness to approve claims of privilege based on the Crown's interest in protecting itself from
"ill-informed or captious public or political criticism." Conway, [1968] 1 All E.R. at 818.




centralization, the executive claimed to remove from junior officials the
power to disclose official documents-including the power to comply with
subpoenas and other demands made by the courts. The executive thus took
the position that, because of the Housekeeping Act and the executive's own
regulations, the federal courts had no power to compel the production of
any documents by junior agency officials. Because of the sometimes insur-
mountable difficulties involved in securing orders against senior agency
officials, this amounted, as a practical matter, to the assertion that the
executive's disclosure of documents in response to court orders was a matter
wholly within the discretion of the executive.47
In 1951, this matter came before the Supreme Court in Touhy v. Ragen,48
where, for the evident purpose of protecting the identity and safety of an
informer, a local FBI agent was ordered not to comply with a court-ordered
subpoena. The district court found the local agent in contempt and the
court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the department's "centraliz-
ing" regulations were authorized by the statute and that, under those
regulations, the department enjoyed a "privilege" to withhold the docu-
ments.
When the matter came before the Supreme Court, the executive branch
claimed that, under the statute and the regulations, it enjoyed a broad and
absolute privilege and that it was the sole judge of the application of that
privilege.49 Justice Stanley Reed, writing for a majority, ruled simply that
the Attorney General had the power to instruct his subordinate to refuse
to produce the documents in question. In so doing, he justified his decision
by reference to "the variety of information contained in the files of any
government department and the possibilities of harm from unrestricted
disclosure in court."' 50 Given the breadth of his expressed concern, Reed-
one of Franklin Roosevelt's first solicitors general and an extraordinarily
consistent supporter of the prerogatives of the federal executive-apparently
supported the executive's claim that it ought to enjoy not just the power
to disgorge its documents only through senior officials but also the further
power not to disgorge, even if the subpoena were directed at the senior
official .5 But whatever might have been Reed's preference in the matter,
47. Such a privilege-in-effect would correspond closely to a statutory privilege that the
executive enjoyed under the "call rule" in the Court of Claims. See infra notes 83-113 and
accompanying text.
48. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
49. According to the handwritten notes-evidently Reed's-on the informal bench memo
that was prepared for Reed by his clerk, the "U.S. does not admit A.G. can be forced to
disclose to court. Response 15." Memorandum to Justice Stanley Reed From Law Clerk (No.
83, 1950 Term) (available from University of Kentucky Library, Box 205, Stanley Reed Papers)
(on file at offices of the Indiana Law Journal).
50. Touhy, 340 U.S. at 468 (emphasis added).
51. Fred Rodell reports that "[i]t has become common to assess Reed's record on the
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the Court did not reach the executive's claim of privilege. The reason, so
far as I can tell from the opinion and from Reed's own notes, was that
the Court was deeply divided on the question and that Reed simply did not
have the votes.5 2 In any event, it was understood at the time that Reed and
Court in terms of his allegedly inconsistent voting position and his consequent shifts between
left, right, and center during his seventeen years as a Justice." F. RODELL, NnE MEN 267
(1955). Rodell, however, finds Reed's votes to be:
neither inconsistent nor even unpredictable if read in terms of the different kinds
of issues he has faced. From the beginning, he has been a strong federal-
government man, upholding its laws and the orders of its administrative agencies,
whether directed against wealth or against personal freedom of citizens; correl-
atively, he has been against state regulation and taxes where they might butt in
to national control. If he has sometimes seemed liberal on labor problems and
conservative, or anti-tax, on taxes, it was partly because the labor cases dealt
more often with pro-labor federal action and the new taxes came mostly from
states.... In the civil liberties cases, where Reed, despite his personal good-will-
toward-men, built up the most reactionary record of any Roosevelt Justice, he
was simply deferring as usual to state action where it did not interfere with the
supremacy of the nation.
Id. at 268-69; see also id. at 307 (to Reed-"alone of the Roosevelt Justices-Uncle Sam could
almost do no wrong"), 252 ("argued most of the big New Deal cases before the Court"), 278
("conspicuously did not" insist on giving constitutional breaks to criminals).
52. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, explained his belief-evidently contrary to what he
understood to be Reed's view-that the Attorney General could indeed be reached by legal
process and could not take refuge behind the Housekeeping Act. Touhy, 340 U.S. at 472-73
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This concurrence provided the occasion for a disagreement between Reed and Frankfurter
that degenerated into highly inventive name-calling. Frankfurter evidently believed that Reed
was ruling that "the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his subordinates, though within
a court's jurisdiction, to produce documents" and that he would be prepared in another case
to hold that "the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be procedurally reached."
This, according to Frankfurter, "would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice that ought
to make Bentham's skeleton rattle." Id. at 473. It is noteworthy that Frankfurter's original
draft had Mr. Bentham turning in his grave. That language was corrected when the Justice
was reminded "that Bentham's body was not buried but dissected, so that his skeleton is still
seeable at the University College, London." Memorandum for the Conference to Justice
Stanley Reed from Justice Felix Frankfurter (March 3, 1951) (on file at offices of the Indiana
Law Journal). Justice Reed's copies of those drafts and of the March 3, 1951 "memorandum
for the conference" from "F.F." are available from University of Kentucky Library, Box
205, Stanley Reed Papers.
Justice Reed evidently took all of this business about fox-hunting, turning bodies and rattling
skeletons quite personally. His hand-written note on the first draft of Frankfurter's concurrence
reads as follows: "FF-As Hughes was told by Butler - 'You know better.' . . . For the life
of me I don't see the point. This last will set all the judges nutty. Respectfully, S. Reed."
Draft of Supreme Court opinion in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, Justice Stanley
Reed's copy (dated for recirculation February 2, 1951) (available from University of Kentucky
Library, Box 205, Stanley Reed Papers) (on file at offices of the Indiana Law Journal). After
receiving Frankfurter's answer, Reed responded as follows on the next draft he received from
Frankfurter: "It makes Reed writhe in his chair, if he were deader he would turn in his grave,
to see a revered associate try to poison the reason of his successors with a suggestion that the
AG may be beyond process." Draft of Supreme Court opinion in United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, Justice Stanley Reed's copy (dated for recirculation February 2, 1951) (available




his brethren had approved what was the practical, if not the formal,
equivalent of an absolute privilege. 3
Thus, at least until its amendment in 1958, the Housekeeping Act was
read, in effect, to empower the federal executive to create, through its own
internal regulations, an absolute privilege-in-effect that permitted the exec-
utive to keep documents secret from the courts when, in its judgment,
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.5 4 The assertion of this
privilege-in-effect could be based on any argument that satisfied the exec-
utive. In this way this privilege could incorporate among a great many
other claims, the deliberative rationale and the general deliberative privilege.
2. The Establishment of Common Law Executive Privileges
for Quasi-judicial Deliberations, State Secrets, and the
Identity of Informers
Apart from developments related to the privilege-in-effect that may have
been provided by the Housekeeping Act, the Supreme Court also identified
and approved a series of specific, narrowly drawn common law privileges
available to the executive. These common law privileges involved quasi-
judicial deliberations, state secrets, and the identity of informers. What is
significant for present purposes is that none of these common law privileges
were either intended or understood to include those matters that subsequently
came to be covered by the general deliberative privilege.
The first of these common law privileges arose from the Supreme Court's
1936 and 1941 decisions in Morgan v. United States.5 5 In 1936, the Court
had observed that "it was not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions if he gave the hearing
53. In 1960, a commentator observed that, despite the technically narrow holding in Touhy,
"the practical effect of these cases [Touhy and a predecessor case] would not have been
greater had they expressly ruled that the department heads need not respond to a subpoena.
Since subordinate officials within a court's jurisdiction cannot under Boske and Touhy be
held in contempt, and since the trial court ordinarily has no jurisdiction over the department
head, discretion as to what information, if any, will be released lies with the department's
chief." Note, Private Litigants, supra note 3, at 452.
54. There is strong evidence that after Touhy the executive found a great many occasions
to keep secrets. See legislative history of the 1958 amendment, in particular the House
Committee's surveys of executive agencies and the bases they claimed for the right to keep
secrets. H.R. REP. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 634 (1958) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1461]. The privilege did not, however, come before the courts. In part, this was because the
executive asserted the privilege against the Congress and the public. The executive may also
have had some incentive not to give the judiciary the opportunity to approve or disapprove
its reading of the statute. There was, after all, no evidence that Congress ever intended the
statute to authorize the keeping of secrets and, when they carne before the courts, statutory
privileges were being narrowly read.
55. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan I1).
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which the law required. ' s6 In 1941, the Court explained its deference to the
Secretary by reference to the fact that Congress had expressly charged the
Secretary with "adjudicatory functions," 5 7 that the administrative proceeding
had a "judicial" character,58 and that the Secretary had proceeded in the
manner of a judge. 9 Thus, the Court regarded the administrative proceedings
as those of a "collaborative instrumentalit[y] of justice" and gave the
Secretary the same deference, respect and immunity it would have given to
another court. 60 Accordingly, the Supreme Court demonstrated an unwill-
ingness to probe the mental processes of a cabinet secretary acting, pursuant
to congressional delegation, in the manner of a judge charged with resolving
a formally-contested proceeding.
The next case involving executive privilege was United States v. Reynolds,61
decided in 1953. In Reynolds, the Secretary of the Air Force sought to
avoid disclosure of information that was sought in connection with a suit
arising from the death of three civilians killed in a crash of a military
aircraft engaged in testing secret electronic equipment. The executive asserted
that "the executive department heads have power to withhold any documents
in their custody from judicial view if they deem it to be in the public
interest." ' 62 The Court, however, rejected this broad "public interest" stan-
dard in favor of a much narrower "privilege against revealing military
secrets. ' 63 Moreover, it adopted the procedures that the House of Lords
had established in Duncan when it ruled that, before documents may be
regarded as privileged, "[tihere must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer."6 It followed Duncan still
further when it ruled that "[t]he court ... must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure [to the court] of the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect. ' 6 Thus, in matters related to the preservation of
military secrets, the courts were instructed to probe the claims of the
Secretary only in proportion to the showing that had been made concerning
56. Morgan I1, 304 U.S. at 18.
57. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 421-22.
58. Id. at 422 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936) (Morgan 1)).
The Court had also noted in Morgan II that "[t]he proceeding had all the essential elements
of contested litigation, with the Government and its counsel on the one side and the appellants
and their counsel on the other." Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 20.
59. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422.
60. Id.; see also United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939) (Morgan III).
61. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1.
62. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 6-7.
64. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). As to the derivation of these rules from Duncan, see
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-9 and especially notes 20-22.
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the necessity of disclosure. 6 In this case, the Court found the showing of
necessity to be weak67 and concluded that the trial judge ought not to have
ordered that they be produced for his inspection.
The third case, Roviaro v. United States,68 decided in 1957, involved the
right of a criminal defendant to compel the government to disclose the
identity of an undercover informant who had been directly involved in the
allegedly criminal transaction. The government asserted that the informer's
identity was privileged and both the trial court and the Supreme Court
agreed.69 The high Court also concluded, however, that the privilege was
qualified, that its availability depended on the balance of public interests
in light of the particular circumstances of the case, and that the circum-
stances in the case at bar did not warrant its availability.70
C. Eisenhower Asserts the Privilege in Stonewalling
McCarthy, 1954
Until 1958, when the Court of Claims decided Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. United States,7  what I have called the deliberative
rationale was unknown to the federal courts. Indeed, when this rationale
made its first appearance in federal discourse, it was neither through a
court nor through lawyers but through an army general turned President.
Dwight Eisenhower offered the rationale as the justification for the assertion
of executive privilege by which he barred his subordinates from providing
certain testimony demanded by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the course of
the Army-McCarthy proceedings. 72
66. Id. at 9-11.
67. Id. at 11.
68. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
69. Id. at 59.
70. Id. at 60-61, 65.
71. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1958).
72. The confrontation between Eisenhower and his fellow-Republican Senator McCarthy
came in the last stages of the Senator's notorious crusade against "communists" in the federal
government. See, e.g., S. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER, VOLUME II: THE PRESIDENT (1984). The
crusade began in 1950 as an assault against President Truman's Democratic administration.
But it continued well beyond Eisenhower's Republican victory in 1952, ending only with the
televised Army-McCarthy hearings and the Senate's censure of McCarthy in 1954. Though the
nature of the contest changed when McCarthy found himself campaigning against a Republican
administration, the stakes remained quite high. From Eisenhower's perspective, McCarthy
threatened, among other things, Eisenhower's control of his own party and administration,
the reputations and effectiveness of the President's subordinates, and the viability of the
nation's nuclear weapons program. See, e.g., id. at 141, 163, 165-66, 171, 219.
At the time of the Army-McCarthy hearings, the American people were taking Senator
McCarthy very seriously. Thus, "opinions polls reported in early 1954 that 50 percent of the
people approved of McCarthy and another 21 percent 'did not know."' A. LINK & W. CATON,
A.mucAN EPocH 743 (1963).
There were three issues involved in the hearing. The first was the charge that McCarthy's
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Eisenhower's lawyers had advised him that he was entitled to refuse to
cooperate with McCarthy, but offered, as justification for that entitlement,
only what was by then the executive's conventional recitation on the
separation of powers.73 But when, amid suggestions that McCarthy had
found the "smoking gun," Eisenhower ordered that no further information
be disclosed, he relied not on these separation of powers arguments but
instead-and, so far as I can determine, for the first time in federal
discourse-on what is now recognized as the deliberative rationale. Thus,
he argued that "it is essential to efficient and effective administration that
employees of the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid
in advising with each other on official matters." 74 Therefore, he said, "it
is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communica-
tions, or any documents or reproductions, concerning such advice be dis-
associate, Roy Cohn, had put improper pressure on the Army in order to secure special
treatment for his colleague David Schine. The second arose from McCarthy's counter-attack
in which he accused the Army of lax security and of an attempt to blackmail his committee.
And the third was McCarthy's charge that members of Eisenhower's administration had taken
improper measures to frustrate McCarthy's, and thus the Senate's, investigation of the charges
concerning Fort Monmouth. The crisis in that confrontation came in May, 1954, when testimony
before McCarthy's subcommittee revealed that there had been a high-level meeting within the
administration for the evident purpose of laying a strategy to frustrate McCarthy's probe.
73. In March of 1954, Eisenhower made the first of a series of requests to Attorney
General Brownell for advice concerning his powers to protect his subordinates from McCarthy's
Senate investigation. Eisenhower's notes indicate that he called Brownell on March 2 to discuss
the subpoena powers of the committee. Those notes say, "I suppose the President can refuse
to comply, but when it comes down to people down the line appointed to office, I don't
know what the answer is. I would like to have a brief memo on precedent, etc.-just what I
can do in this regard." S. AMBROSE, supra note 72, at 162 n.31 (quoting Eisenhower Papers
and telephone calls from March 2, 1954). Further requests were made on March 29 and on
May 3 and 5. Id. at 165-66 n.42, 186.
What he received in response to this and later inquiries to the Justice Department appear
to have been boilerplate recitations of conventional separation of powers arguments. Those
arguments contained not so much as a hint of the deliberative rationale. The formal memo-
randum of law that President Eisenhower attached to his claim of privilege was signed by
Attorney General Brownell and, despite its considerable length, makes no reference to "pre-
serving candor" on which Eisenhower said he was resting his claim. The Brownell memorandum
is reprinted under the title Memorandum on Separation of Powers, 14 FED. B.J. 73 (1954).
Brownell's arguments were the same ones that had earlier been made by Herman Wolkinson,
then a subordinate attorney at the Department of Justice, in a series of articles titled Demands
of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 Fm. B.J. 103, 223, 319 (1949).
The consistency of the department's position on these matters is reflected in the fact that
Attorney General William P. Rogers submitted the Wolkinson material, largely verbatim and
wholly without attribution, in a memo to Congress. Freedom of Information and Secrecy in
the Government: Hearing on S. 921 and the Power of the President to Withhold Information
from the Congress Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1958) (letter from Attorney General William P. Rogers
to Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. (March 13, 1958)); see also Rogers, Constitutional Law:
The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A. J. 941 (1958).
74. Letter to the Secretary of Defense, Pui3. PAPERs 483 (May 17, 1954) (directing him to
withhold certain information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations).
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closed. ' 75 The evidence suggests that this idea did not come from the
President's lawyers but that it represented, instead, one of those "principles
of organizational leadership" that Dwight Eisenhower had brought with
him from his career in the military. 76
Three things should be noted about Eisenhower's assertion of the privilege.
First, the privilege was not initially asserted in court, but rather in the
political arena. Moreover, that initial use was in connection with a contre-
temps in which the President's assertion of executive privilege was popu-
larly-even uncritically-received. Second, the source of that assertion was
the military culture in which Dwight Eisenhower had spent almost his entire
adult life. Third, once the deliberative rationale was offered and accepted,
it spread like wildfire.:" By 1958, the persuasiveness of this rationale had
75. Id. at 483-84.
76. Eisenhower's views on the responsibilities that a commander owes to his subordinate
are related to his thinking about military leadership. During World War II, he wrote to Lord
Mountbatten on the occasion of Mountbatten's appointment as Supreme Commander of the
Southeast Asia Theater:
[W]hen the time comes that [the supreme commander] himself feels he must
make a decision, he must make it in clean-cut fashion and on his own respon-
sibility and take full blame for anything that goes wrong; in fact he must be
quick to take the blame for anything that goes wrong whether or not it results
from his mistake or from an error on the part of a subordinate.
S. AMBROSE, THE SurRam: COMMANDER: THE WAR YEARS OF GENERAL DwIGHT D. EISENHOWER
224 (1970). Similarly, in explaining why he regarded George Marshall as having the leadership
characteristics of a "great soldier," Eisenhower praised him as "quick, tough, tireless, decisive
and a real leader. He accepts responsibility automatically and never goes back on a subordi-
nate." Id. at 50.
Further evidence that the deliberative rationale had its origins in Eisenhower's military career
can be found in the particular language he used in speaking about the matter. It was a matter
between "a staff officer" and "his chief," D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANCE 328 (1963);
between a "commander" and "his subordinates," E. RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DwIor
D. EISENHOWER 84 (1979) (News Conference Remarks, July 6, 1955); and between a "superior
and his subordinates." F. GREENSTEIN, Tan HIDDEN HAND PRESIDENCY (1982). Similarly, some
months before the McCarthy matter came to a head in May, Eisenhower had issued a
"Personal and Confidential" memorandum to all department and agency heads concerning
the need to protect subordinates from Senator McCarthy. It contained the exhortation that:
Each superior, including me, must remember the obligations he has to his own
subordinates. These obligations comprise, among other things, the protection of
those subordinates, through all legal and proper means available, against attacks
of a character under which they might otherwise be helpless.... No hope of
any kind of political advantage, no threat from any source, should lead anyone
to forsake these principles of organizational leadership.
Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
77. Once articulated, this deliberative rationale spread quickly within the executive branch.
Eisenhower repeatedly invoked it and executive agencies came to rely heavily upon the May
17 letter as primary authority for keeping secrets. See, e.g., Eisenhower's invocation of the
rationale during the Dixon-Yates controversy; see also H.R. REP. No. 1461, supra note 54, at
3-12 (responses to the 1955 questionnaire and the 1955-56 testimony on the amendment of the
Housekeeping Act).
Even the lawyers, after initially ignoring it, began to include it in their arguments. In 1958,
the government argued the rationale, based solely on the Eisenhower statement, to the Court
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become something that at least one legal commentator already took for
granted.71 When the executive placed this argument before the Court of
Claims-citing as authority nothing but the British House of Lords and
Eisenhower's May 17 letter-the deliberative privilege entered easily into
the jurisprudence of the federal courts.
D. Congress Amends the Housekeeping Act, 1958
In 1958, participants in the still-young "freedom of information"
movement79 succeeded, despite executive opposition, irl securing an amend-
ment that limited the scope of the Housekeeping Act. 0 The statute had
of Claims in Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 939. The Eisenhower rationale was persuasive
and found its way into the federal courts through the decision in Kaiser, which was written
by Mr. Justice Stanley Reed, then retired and sitting by designation on the Court of Claims.
78. By 1957, Professor Bishop could remark that it seemed odd that earlier evidence
treatises had overlooked it. Bishop, supra note 3, at 477.
79. The freedom of information movement had its origin in the concerns that certain
members of the print media felt over censorship and threats to press freedoms in other
countries in the period immediately following World War II. The American Society of
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) first became involved in this issue in 1943, G. Kennedy, Advocates
of Openness: The Freedom of Information Movement 17 (August 1978) (Ph.D. dissertation
published on demand by Univ. Microfilms Int'l, 300 N. Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 48106),
and formed its Committee on World Freedom of Information in 1948, Id. at 24.
During the earliest period of the Cold War, ASNE also became involved in opposing various
domestic initiatives that adversely affected the media's access to governmental information.
Id. at 21-25. One of these involved its opposition to a regulation issued by the Veterans
Administration, pursuant to President Truman's 1947 loyalty program, that forbade as "dis-
loyal" the unauthorized disclosure of any information "which, although not endangering the
national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any govern-
mental activity, or any individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty."
80. In about 1950, the freedom of information movement had begun to organize against
what it perceived to be excessive secrecy on the part of the federal executive. The movement
originated in certain parts of the national media and soon found allies in Congress, the most
important of whom was Congressman John Moss. Its initial campaign was in two parts, one
conducted in the arena of public education and the other, in Congress, directed toward an
amendment limiting the scope of the Housekeeping Act. The movement was specifically
concerned that the statute was being used to shield thoroughly routine documents-"papers
pertaining to the day-to-day business of Government which are not restricted under other
specific laws nor classified as military information or secrets of state." H.R. REP. No. 1461,
supra note 54, at 1.
Those who sought this amendment saw themselves less as seeking to modify the doctrine or
the effect of Touhy than as seeking to modify the day-to-day behavior of the executive,
behavior that took place generally outside the courts and that often involved executive assertions
of privilege against Congress. Nevertheless, the movement sought changes that would eliminate
Justice Reed's argument that the Housekeeping Act might be a basis for asserting a broad
executive privilege. The proponents of the amendment clearly saw certain kinds of government
secrets as antithetical to good government. Thus, the House Committee charged that "[t]he
executive departments and agencies and some of their employees have used [the Housekeeping
Act] to cover up their own shortcomings." Id. at 14. Lower levels of secrecy would lead to
higher levels of accountability which, in turn, would lead to more effective government. See
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previously authorized the head of each executive department to "prescribe
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for ... the custody, use, and
preservation" of the department's "records" and "papers." To that lan-
guage was now added the proviso that "[tihis section does not authorize
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of
records to the public. 81 By this Act, Congress eliminated any broad
privilege-in-effect that might have been approved by Justice Reed's decision
in Touhy.82 It also eliminated the possibility that the executive might one
day persuade the judiciary to read this statute as authority for the kind of
omnibus privilege-as broad as the executive's notion of the public interest-
that the House of Lords had granted to the British Crown, and that Justice
Reed had seemed ready to grant to the federal executive.
E. The Privilege Adopted in the Court of Claims:
The Kaiser Decision, 1958
The general deliberative privilege was first approved by a United States
federal court in 1958 when the Court of Claims decided Kaiser.3 That
decision was written by Justice Stanley Reed who had, since writing the
majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Touhy, retired from the high
court and accepted a seat, by designation, on the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims has been unique among federal courts both for its
general resistance to the liberalization of discovery and for its historical
penchant for granting asymmetric advantages to the federal executive.
Regarding the former, this court has remained about forty years behind the
district courts. Thus, for instance, depositions have been freely available in
the district courts since 1938-without leave of court, without regard to
whether the deponent was a party or a non-party, and without regard to
whether the deposition was being taken for purposes of evidence or for
purposes of discovery. 4 In the Court of Claims, it was not until 1964 that
id. at 2.
This first freedom of information campaign was conducted through numerous initiatives
including the publication of Harold Cross' THE PEoPLE's RIGHT TO KNOW, supra note 3, and
a series of highly visible hearings held by Moss' congressional committee during 1955. H.R.
REP. No. 1461, supra note 54, at 3-11. Throughout, the proponents of open government
sought to publicize the degree and circumstances of government secrecy as well as particular
allegations of abuse.
81. Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 347 (1958) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301
(1988)).
82. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
83. 157 F. Supp. at 944, 946.
84. 8 C. Wiu=ar & A. MILR, supra note 3, at 361-64 & 364 nn.1-2 (discussing Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30 and setting out all forms taken by the rule since its adoption in
1938).
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depositions could be taken for purposes of discovery 85 and not until 1982
that they could be taken without leave of the court.8 6 The same kind of
generational lag can be found in connection with written interrogatories,87
document demands, 88 and requests for admission.8 9
The Court of Claims' attitude toward discovery against the federal ex-
ecutive was not just restrained but asymmetric. This is a court that has
only one job-to hear claims brought against the federal executive. At this
time in its history it was still an article I court. For reasons that were
probably related to its specialized function and its relatively low status, it
seems fair to say that it was dominated by-or at least extraordinarily
attentive to-the interests of the federal executive. The clearest example of
this is to be found in the rules governing the discovery of documents. Until
the early 1950s, the only way a plaintiff in the Court of Claims could
secure pre-trial discovery against the government was through the "call
rule.'"'9 That rule permitted the discovery of non-privileged information or
papers but it also provided that, when the discovery is sought against the
government, "the head of any department or agency may refuse to comply
with [the] call issued pursuant to this subsection [i.e., the document request]
when, in his opinion, compliance would be injurious to the public interest." 9'
Thus, while discovery against the private plaintiff wasocompulsory, the
government enjoyed a broad option to decline compliance with discovery
85. The 1957 rules of the Court of Claims permitted depositions to be taken only for
purposes of preserving evidence. Ct. Cl. R. 29. The 1964 rules permitted, for the first time,
depositions to be taken for purposes of discovery. Ct. Cl. R. 30.
86. Compare the 1982 Rules of the Federal Claims Court, CL. CT. R. 30 (a) (no requirement
of leave of court) with the strict requirements of the 1969 rules, Ct. Cl. R. 74, or the 1957
rules, Ct. Cl. R. 29.
87. In the federal district courts, written interrogatories have been available without leave
of court since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 8 C. W GH-r &
A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 481-82 & nn.1-2 (setting out all forms taken by the rule since its
adoption in 1938). In the Court of Claims, written interrogatories first became available on
leave of the court in 1982. See Ct. Cl. R. 73 (1969); CL. CT. R. 33 (1982).
88. Under the federal rules, document discovery has been available, on a showing of good
cause, since 1938. The requirement of good cause was dropped as to discovery against third
parties in 1948 and, in 1970, as to discovery against parties to the litigation. 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 582-83 & nn.1-2. In the Court of Claims, document demands
with leave of the court were not available until 1964 and document demands without leave of
the court did not become available until 1982. Ct. Cl. R. 40(a) (1964); CL. CT. R. 34 (1982).
This discovery device is different from a subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with a
oral deposition.
89. Requests for admission without leave of court have been available under the federal
rules since 1938. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 700-02 & n.1 (setting out all
forms taken by the rule since its adoption in 1938). In the Court of Claims, they became
available on leave of the court in 1963, Ct. Cl. R. 42(a), and without leave of the court in
1982. CL. CT. R. 36(a).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2507 (1982).
91. Id. § 2507(a).
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requests coming from the private plaintiff. 92 Even the official history of the
Court of Claims concedes that this arrangement "gave the Government,
always the defendant in the court, an obvious lopsided advantage in dis-
covery." 93
An effort was made, beginning in 1947, to revise the rules of the Court
of ClaimsM in order to close the gap between its discovery provisions and
those of the federal rules of civil procedure95 and to bring the discovery
rights of the private plaintiff into better balance with those of the govern-
ment defendant.9 Thus, the rules of the Court of Claims were twice
modified, once in 1951 to incorporate the subpoena power contained in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 and again in 1953 to incorporate, subject
to a number of weakening modifications, the general discovery provisions
of the federal rules.97 In response, the executive mounted and sustained a
vigorous campaign to defend the asymmetrical prerogatives that it had
historically enjoyed in this court. Its first two lines of defense proved
insufficient; the Kaiser decision tested its third.
First, the executive argued that the "call rule" was the sole and exclusive
authority by which the court could secure the production of government
documents and that, accordingly, the newly authorized subpoena duces
tecum must be inderstood as available for use by the government but not
by the private plaintiff. This argument was rejected first by the Court of
Claims9s and then by Congress." Next, the executive sought to regain the
ground that it had lost by working within the new discovery rules. Those
rules, like the civil rules on which they were modelled, limited discovery to
material "not privileged." 100 Thus, the executive claimed that the plaintiff's
right of discovery was subject, through this "not privileged" language, to
92. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2507 (calls against the government) with 28 U.S.C. § 2504 (1982)
(calls against the plaintiff).
93. W. COWEN, P. NicHoLs & M. BENNmT, TEE UNITED STATES CouRT OF CLAIMS: A
HISTORY, PART 11 106 (1978) (the official bicentennial history).
94. 1964 Ct. Cl. R. iii.
95. 1964 Ct. Cl. R. iv; Evans, Current Procedures in the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J.
422, 424 n.11 (1966) (Evans was a member of the Court of Claims Committee on Rules
beginning in 1950 and served as chairman of the Committee beginning in 1959. Id. at 422
(biographical information)).
96. W. COWEN, P. NxcuoLs & M. BEawwr, supra note 93, at 106.
97. The first of those revisions incorporated, with modifications, large segments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but, while it included the subpoena power provided in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45, it did not include the other discovery provisions of the federal
rules. 118 Ct. Cl. 25, 25-38 (1951). The 1953 revisions incorporated those discovery rules
subject to a number of weakening provisions. 126 Ct. Cl. 26 (1953).
98. Kamen Soap Prods. Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 430 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
99. Act of September 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2507 (1988)
(amendment to the call statute)).
100. Rule 38(a)(1) of the 1964 rules defines the "scope of discovery" by explaining that




the government's right under the old call rule to refuse to produce documents
that, in its unreviewable judgment, ought not be disclosed 01 This attempt
to preserve prerogatives by converting them into privileges was, in 1955,
rejected by the Court of Claims.? 2
Finally, in Kaiser, the government sought to retain most of the benefits
it had enjoyed under the call rule by arguing that the "not privileged"
language incorporated not the government's prerogatives under the call
rule-for that rule had been displaced by the new provisions-but a common
law privilege that, as fortune would have it, granted the executive virtually
all the prerogatives it had enjoyed under the old, asymmetric regime. 03 The
case involved the plaintiff's post-war purchase of three aluminum plants
from the Liquidator of War Assets and its claim that the government had
breached the most-favored-basis provision of its purchase agreement.""4 The
plaintiff originally sought discovery under the call rule but the executive
exercised its prerogative under the rule and refused to produce. 10 5 The
plaintiff resubmitted its request under the newly adopted discovery rules.
The executive then claimed privilege and refused to permit the commissioner
to inspect the documents for purposes of validating the claim."' 6 The
commissioner recommended sanctions and the government appealed to the
court. 107
In writing the court's decision in Kaiser, Justice Reed took what might
be regarded, in the contexts of the Court of Claims and of the extremity
of the executive's claims, as a moderate position. He approved the delib-
erative privilege while rejecting the executive's claim that it was the sole
101. The government "took the position that the words 'not privileged' could not be given
their customary meaning, as understood in the law of evidence, in relation to departments
and agencies of the Government, but must be construed only to mean not privileged according
to determination by the head of the department or agency." Evans, supra note 95, at 429.
102. Benson v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 347 (Ct. Cl. 1955). The government continued
to argue this position for at least three years after its loss in Benson. In its argument to the
Court of Claims in Kaiser, the government made plain that it was not abandoning this position.
While acknowledging that its position had been rejected in Benson, it "reasserted" this
argument "with the respectful request that the Court reconsider its decision in that case."
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Requiring Production (No. 102-54) at 6 n.2,
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (available
from the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. Court of Claims in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
Defendant's Motion].
103. The government argued first that it enjoyed, under the law of evidence, a privilege for
all documents, including all deliberative documents, the disclosure of which would be contrary
to the public interest. Then the government asserted that under the law of evidence the
executive had the sole and unreviewable discretion to decide what documents were in the public
interest. See Defendant's Motion, supra note 102. This position would have restored all the
prerogatives that the government had enjoyed under the call rule.
104. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 941.
105. Id. at 942-43.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 943-44.
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judge of the validity of its assertion of the privilege in particular cases.108
What is interesting for this Article's purposes is Reed's approval of a
privilege that had never been approved previously by a federal court. In
doing so, he relied on the House of Lord's decision in Duncan'09 and on
the short form of the deliberative rationale that asserts that the disclosure
of documents will chill future deliberations and thus impede effective
administration.10 He also offered an argument, based on sovereign immu-
nity, that the executive "must" enjoy this privilege because the "[g]overnment
from its nature has necessarily been granted a certain freedom from control
beyond that given to the citizen.""' And finally, he deduced the privilege
from a reading of the Morgan"2 decision that ignored the Supreme Court's
explanation that its decision was warranted by the "quasi-judicial" nature
of the cabinet secretary's deliberation. Reed thus extended that rule to cover
all decisionnaking by the executive."'
Within the Court of Claims, Justice Reed's decision had the immediate
effect of restoring to the executive most of the asymmetric advantages it
had enjoyed when the call rule had been the only means of securing the
discovery of documents. In that respect, the decision substantially undid
the reforms by which the Court of Claims might otherwise have eliminated
the government's lopsided advantage in the conduct of discovery.
Beyond the Court of Claims, the effect of Reed's decision would depend
entirely upon the readiness of the general federal courts to follow his lead.
If they were to do so, the doctrine he established would restore to the
executive most of the privilege-in-effect that it had enjoyed under the
Housekeeping Act. In that way, it would undo what the Congress had done
when it amended the Housekeeping Act to preclude the executive's claim
that the statute granted it the authority to keep secrets. Further, if the
108. The court's decision granted the first but not the second of the government's claims
as set out supra in note 103. And in at least one sense, the court granted more than the
government had sought. The government's argument had, with some care, centered upon the
claim that a privilege existed for the intra-agency advice that had been provided to "Cabinet
officials and agency heads." Defendant's Motion, supra note 102, at 8. Justice Reed's decision
ignored that limitation, went further than was necessary to decide the Kaiser case, and
established a privilege for all "confidential intra-agency advisory opinions." Kaiser Aluminum,
157 F. Supp. at 946.
109. [1942] App. Cas. 624; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
110. Justice Reed's enthusiasm for this argument pales compared to that of the government
defendant. Justice Reed's views were that the government had argued that, without the general
deliberative privilege, government officials "could not obtain advice" and that "[iut is plain
common sense that Government as we know it would all but stop functioning." Defendant's
Motion, supra note 102, at 8-10.
111. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946. He further asserted that the prerogatives of
the sovereign warrant such an evidentiary privilege even though the government has consented
to be sued. Id.
112. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); Morgan 11, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); see also supra notes
55-70 and accompanying text and infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
113. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946.
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
general federal courts were to follow Reed's lead, the doctrine he had
established would grant the executive most of the "public interest" privilege
that the executive had sought in Touhy and that Justice Reed, though not
the Supreme Court as a whole, had seemed ready to grant.
The next episode in this history reveals the wholesale adoption of Reed's
privilege by the federal district courts and the courts of appeal. At this
juncture three points should be noted. One is that, if the executive had
been successful with either of the first two arguments by which it sought
to preserve the prerogatives it had historically enjoyed in the Court of
Claims, its victory would have been confined to that court. Because the
executive lost the first two rounds but won the third, its victory proved
magnificently exportable.
The second point is that, notwithstanding what actually happened next,
there was good reason why this privilege might not have made its way from
the Court of Claims to the district courts. These reasons include the facts
that the Court of Claims was, at that time, a decidedly marginal court and
that Reed's arguments were not particularly strong. Still more striking
though, is the fact that Kaiser was a single battle in a larger war over
whether the federal executive would continue to enjoy prerogatives in the
Court of Claims that were greater than those that it enjoyed in the district
courts. The argument that, because the Court of Claims granted this privilege
to the executive, the district court must then modify its rules to conform
to those in the Court of Claims is, to say the least, less than compelling.
The third point is that the text of the Kaiser opinion has two different
meanings depending upon whether it is read strictly within the context in
which it was decided. Within its context, the meaning of the text is "Justice
Reed, retired, imposes a compromise to end a decade of wrangling over
whether the government shall continue to enjoy the idiosyncratic prerogatives
that it has historically enjoyed in the Court of Claims." Lifted out of its
context, the same text may be read instead to mean "Justice Reed, retired,
approves the general deliberative privilege for use in the federal courts." It
now seems clear that the power of this text to project the general deliberative
privilege into the federal district courts has been considerably enhanced by
the fact that there is nothing within the text that forces its contextualization
and that those who litigate in the general federal courts know almost
nothing about the Court of Claims. Thus, Kaiser has been read exactly as
if it had been decided by a federal district court. Only the government was
knowledgeable about both bars, and it was the clear beneficiary of the non-
contextual reading of Kaiser.
F. Kaiser is Followed and Elaborated Upon in the
General Federal Courts
Since Kaiser was decided in 1958, the general deliberative privilege has
spread from the Court of Claims to the federal district courts and circuit
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courts of appeal. Moreover, in the large number of decisions written by the
general federal courts in the last 30 years, the question of whether there
ought to be a privilege has received only the most perfunctory and stylized
attention. All the serious energies of the courts have, instead, gone into the
development of rules related to the application of the privilege.
The propriety of the privilege itself has generally not been the subject of
serious examination or inquiry but only of short, conclusory recitations.
Most courts have confined themselves to a simple citation to one or more
of what have come to be regarded as the leading cases dealing with this
privilege. Those few courts that go further in the direction of instrumental
analysis have done no more than to offer a short, epigrammatic quote from
one of the leading cases. Invariably, these epigrams are nothing but an
uncritical recitation of the claim that disclosure in the course of litigation
will diminish the effectiveness of future deliberations and thus do injury to
the public interest. Finally, a certain number of courts have gone still further
and offered, without elaboration, their view that the general deliberative
privilege is either authorized or supported by some body of authority external
to the common law of judicial privilege. Thus, courts have invoked such
bodies of authority as the separation of powers," 4 the Morgan doctrine," 5
the Freedom of Information Act" 6 and cases decided under that act, and
proposed-but rejected-Federal Rule of Evidence 509."1 In the end, these
courts have taken entirely for granted the conclusion that this privilege
exists and that its continued existence is fully warranted. While they have
sometimes gone through certain of the motions that might be associated
with the exercise of judgment, the federal district courts and courts of
appeal have not identified or probed any of the weaknesses in the deliberative
rationale or in the proffered arguments from external authority.
The efforts of the federal courts with regard to the rules governing the
application of this privilege have, however, been prodigious. They have
defined the scope of the general privilege both in terms of the communi-
cations to which it applies and to the litigation circumstances in which it
may be raised. Thus, the federal courts have confined the privilege to those
communications that seem most vulnerable to chilling"8 and, at least some-
times, they have disallowed the privilege in those litigation circumstances in
which it is most likely to cause serious injustice." 9 The courts have also
imposed demanding procedural requirements on the executive, requirements
114. See infra note 186 and cases cited therein.
115. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946; see also sources cited infra note 215.
116. See infra notes 245-46 and cases cited therein.
117. See infra note 236 and cases and treatise cited therein.




that were borrowed from Reynolds'2 and, before that, Duncan.2' According
to these requirements, the privilege must be asserted through an affidavit
from the head of the executive agency on the basis of his personal review
of the documents in question, the documents must be identified with
particularity, and the agency head must provide a clear statement of the
need for confidentiality.'2 Finally, the courts have adopted a decisional
process that appears sensitive to the needs of justice. Thus, on the basis of
the executive's particularized submission, the court claims to balance the
relevant factors-including the discovering party's need for the evidence
and the risk that disclosure will lead to chilling-and determine whether the
claim of privilege ought to be sustained. 23
The procedural regime established in Duncan and adopted in Reynolds
was designed to protect military secrets even from the judge. When those
rules were imported as a rule of application for the general deliberative
privilege, they were imported into an arena that was different in important
respects from the arena of military secrets. With regard to the general
deliberative privilege, the need for secrecy is inherently weaker. The interest
in avoiding embarrassments that chill is much more easily confused with
"advantage in litigation" than is concern to protect military secrets, and
the secrecy justification for relying on the representations of the executive
and refusing disclosure even to the court is virtually non-existent. If, in the
realm of the general deliberative privilege, the courts have fashioned a
decisional process that relies heavily on the representations of the party
seeking to avoid disclosure, the justification for such a process must rest
on judicial efficiency and not the need to keep these deliberations secret
even from the judge.
Each of these procedural requirements has a purpose, although it is not
clear how likely the procedures are to satisfy those purposes. Thus, the
requirement of participation by the agency head is likely to improve the
integrity of the system or restrain the frequency with which the privilege
has been asserted only if the agency head is either more principled or less
committed to winning than is his lawyer. The requirement that the docu-
ments be identified with specificity probably has made it easier for the
parties to narrow the controversy, for the parties seeking discovery to make
their case concerning their need for particular documents, and for the courts
to assess that statement of need. Finally, the requirement that the agency
head provide a clear statement of the need for confidentiality has brought
the courts nothing but rote, boilerplate recitations of the deliberative ra-
120. 345 U.S. at 1; see also supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.





tionale. There is certainly no evidence that agency heads have ever shown
any ability to distinguish between those deliberative documents that are
likely to chill future communications and those that are not.
As to the balancing process, what the courts have done appears roughly
to have been as follows. First, they accept the executive's contention that
disclosure in the course of judicial proceedings will injure the public interest
through chilling executive deliberations. They then grant discovery if and
only if the party seeking discovery shows serious countervailing interests.
This normally means that the party seeking discovery must show that the
documents in question are not just otherwise discoverable but that they are
demonstrably important to her case. Sometimes, in cases of government
misconduct, the court may also take account of the public's right to know.
What is important to note, however, is that while balancing of this kind
may eliminate the most serious injustices that might result from an absolute
privilege, the courts are not conducting a case-by-case assessment of the
seriousness of the risk that disclosure will cause injury to the public interest.
Throughout this balancing process, that proposition is taken as having been
established.
The good news is that the scope of the privilege has been confined so
that it does not extend to those communications where the deliberative
rationale cannot sensibly apply. Moreover, the procedural requirements and
the balancing process appear to have created a situation that minimizes the
likelihood that egregious injury will be done by the application of the
privilege. The bad news, however, is that the courts have taken for granted
that the deliberative rationale is coherent and persuasive and, more generally,
that there is warrant for the continued existence of this privilege. Unfor-
tunately, the procedural requirements and the balancing process have not,
in practice, eliminated quite so many problems as one might have hoped.
G. The Freedom of Information Act
The enactment in 1966 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was
the second and larger victory for the open-government movement that had,
eight years earlier, amended the federal Housekeeping Act to limit its use
as authority for secret-keeping by the executive. As before, the proponents
of change were a combination of those in the media and those in Congress
who, for separate reasons, shared an interest in limiting what they regarded
as overly aggressive claims of secrecy by the executive. Predictably, the
executive opposed this initiative, both before and after enactment of the
statute. Enactment of FOIA was based on the general premise that govern-
ments, especially democracies, function most effectively when they function
openly and are, by virtue of that openness, held accountable for their
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actions. 24 This principle is a mirror image of the rationale for executive
secrecy as it had been explained by the House of Lords, by President
Eisenhower and by the retired Justice Reed.
By its terms, FOIA mandates that, in response to requests properly made,
each federal agency "shall make available to the public" a wide array of
information and agency records. 12 This obligation is, in turn, subject to
nine specified exemptions for, among other things, documents related to
national defense, trade secrets and law enforcement investigations. 12 Ex-
emption five excludes from the general obligation of disclosure those "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law" to a non-governmental party in litigation with the agency. 27
The relationship between, on the one hand, FOIA and its exemption five
and, on the other hand, the general deliberative privilege has several
dimensions. First, and most generally, the enactment of FOIA is, like the
privilege, a chapter in the continuing contest between those who favor
secrecy in government and those who favor disclosure. Second, exemption
five incorporates into its administrative regime a number of judicial privi-
leges enjoyed by the federal executive-in whatever form the courts may
have given them at the time of the FOIA request. These incorporated
privileges include, among others, the attorney-client privilege and the general
deliberative privilege.128 Thus, there has been occasion for a great many
FOIA courts to apply, if not necessarily to assess, the general deliberative
124. The Senate Report begins a section captioned "Purpose of Bill" by quoting James
Madison to the effect that "[K]nowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A
popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a
prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both." FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SoURcE BOOK,
S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1974) [hereinafter SEN. FOIA SOURCE BOOK]. The
report then explains that the Act is, among other things, meant to "establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language." Id. at 38. Less felicitously, the House Report declares that "[a] democratic
society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies
as the quantity and quality of its information varies." Id. at 33.
In signing the bill, President Johnson explained that "[tihis legislation springs from one of
our most essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the Nation permits." Id. at 1.
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in response to a persistent
problem of legislators and citizens, the problem of obtaining adequate information
to evaluate federal programs and formulate wise policies. Congress recognized
that the public cannot make intelligent decisions without such information, and
that governmental institutions become unresponsive to public needs if knowledge
of their activities is denied to the people and their representatives.
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
126. Id. § 552(b).
127. Id. § 552(b)(5).
128. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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privilege. 29 Finally, it has been argued that, through the enactment of
exemption five or through the Supreme Court decisions interpreting that
exemption, Congress or the Court has either authorized or expressly ap-
proved the general deliberative privilege.130 As I explain later in this article,'
these claims are unwarranted.
H. The Proposed Rules of Evidence
The next controversy involving the general deliberative privilege arose in
the drafting and enactment, from 1965 through 1973, of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. This is a story of high-stakes advocacy and by the end, it
became entangled in the rich intrigue of Watergate. Ultimately, though, it
is only the broad outline that is necessary for this work.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted by an Advisory Committee
to the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Committee produced
a preliminary draft in 196932 and a revised draft in 1971,133 both of which
were made available for public comment. It then prepared a revised, final
draft that was transmitted to the Supreme Court. The Court promulgated
those rules in November 1972114 and submitted them to Congress under a
statute that made those rules effective unless vetoed by Congress. 35 The
Department of Justice was a central participant in the process and clearly
sought to protect, to codify and, if possible, to expand the range of
evidentiary privileges that were available to the executive branch. 136 Never-
theless, when it came to the general deliberative privilege, the Advisory
Committee rejected both the Department's proposed expansion of the priv-
ilege and the entire privilege as it then existed at common law. 13 7
129. See infra notes 250-53.
130. See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
133. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
134. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
135. For a description of the general procedure used, see Berger, How the Privilege for
Government Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 747 (1975).
136. See Berger, supra note 135. The Justice Department's objections to the Advisory
Committee's handling of the general deliberative privilege appear in a memorandum that
accompanied the August 9, 1971 letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to
the Chairman of the Rules Committee. Both documents can be found in 117 CONG. Ric.
S33648-57 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971). For his part in the Watergate affair, Mr. Kleindienst
pleaded guilty to not testifying fully before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Berger, supra
note 135, at 748 n.5.
137. In both the preliminary (1969) and the revised (1971) drafts, proposed rule 509 dealt
only with "military and state secrets" and no other provision might be said to extend to the
general deliberative privilege. This omission would have had the effect of eliminating this
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Then, when the Advisory Committee had all but completed its work and
Watergate was beginning to influence the situation, a powerful congressional
ally of the White House announced that, unless the Advisory Committee
proved more attentive to the advice it was receiving from the Department
of Justice, he would press forward with newly introduced legislation that
would eliminate the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court and, through
the Court, the Judicial Conference and its Advisory Committees. 38 The
Advisory Committee saw the light and chose to capitulate. 3 9 Thus, it
withdrew its objection and endorsed verbatim the entirety of the executive's
proposal to expand and codify the general deliberative privilege through
what became proposed rule 509.Y4
At this point, the executive's fortunes changed and what had been won
by bullying the experts on the Advisory Committee was lost in the throes
of Watergate. The House Judiciary Committee was offended by what it
regarded as inappropriate political interference with the work of the Advi-
sory Committee, and would not approve the expansion or codification of
a form of executive privilege that was not supported by a strong showing
of need and that seemed potentially unlimited in its scope and, thus, in its
privilege except as it might be otherwise required by the Constitution or by statute. See rule
501 of the revised draft, 51 F.R.D. at 356.
In its published comments to the revised draft, the Committee made clear that the omission
was intentional. See the Advisory Committee's notes to the revised draft, 51 F.R.D. at 377-
78 (standards of relevance sufficient to protect the government's legitimate interests).
138. The White House ally was Senator John McClelland, who chaired the subcommittee
that controlled appropriations for the federal judiciary and the Judicial Conference. McClelland
came to believe that the executive ought to have its "official information" privilege and, to
underscore this point, he introduced the Court Practice Approval Act, a piece of legislation
that would have all but eliminated the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and the
Judicial Conference. S. 2432, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNo. REc. 29893 (1971). He then
made it clear that if the Advisory Committee did not accede to the suggestions that he and
the Justice Department were making, both these rules of evidence and the entire future of
judicial rule-making would be in grave jeopardy. If, on the other hand, the rules were to
become what McClelland euphemistically called "less controversial," he would be prepared to
defer action on his Court Practice Act. 117 CONG. Rc. 33641-42 (1971).
139. The Advisory Committee got the message. Its leadership met with Senator McClelland
and expressed a willingness to accommodate his suggestions. Berger, supra note 135, at 756 &
n.50. According to McClelland's account:
the chairman of both the standing committee and the Evidence Committee and
the reporter for the rules were kind and generous enough to meet with me here
in Washington .... [What they said to me need not bind their colleagues on
the standing committee but they did express a willingness to take to the committee
a number of additional modifications and clarifications ......
117 CONG. Rc. 33642 (1971).
When the Committee sent its revised final draft to the Supreme Court in December, 1971,
the draft omitted the Committee's previously stated objection to the privilege and provided-
for the first time-an executive privilege for "official information." 2 J. WENSITsN & M.
BaRnaE, supra note 3, 509[01], at 509-24. Because this provision appeared for the first time
in the Committee's third and final draft, it was never subjected to public comment.




potential for abuse.' 4' The firestorm surrounding proposed rule 509 was
ultimately quenched by a compromise under which all of chapter 5-all the
rules concerning privilege-were deleted in favor of a short statement that
these matters would be left to development under common law.
In the end, things looked very much the way they had looked before the
process had begun. All that had happened was that, for a short time before
their rejection by Congress, the executive's grandest hopes had been em-
bodied in proposed rule 509 and had secured the formal support of an
Advisory Committee that had been subjected to the strongest form of.
political coercion. As shall be shown, however, some would soon be arguing
that these events provided warrant for the continued existence of the general
deliberative privilege. 42
I. The United States Supreme Court: The Nixon Cases,
1974 and 1977
As has been shown, the development of the executive privilege in the
United States Supreme Court proceeded through increments that were, in
each case, a narrow and well-justified slice of the much broader privilege
that the executive would plainly have preferred. The first of these involved
quasi-judicial deliberations, 143 the second military and state secrets '44 and
the third, the identity of informers. 45 By the mid-seventies, the Watergate
crisis, having already provided the background against which the fate of
proposed evidence rule 509 was determined, provided the occasion for the
Court to expand the executive privilege through the addition of another
narrow slice of doctrine, this one a "presumptive" privilege for presidential
communications.
The question first arose in United States v. Nixon, 146 a 1974 decision
dealing with the efforts of the Watergate special prosecutor to secure
President Nixon's infamous tapes through the issuance of a third-party
criminal subpoena against the President. The question arose again in Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services, 47 in which then ex-President Nixon
challenged Congress' efforts to preserve government custody of all of
Nixon's presidential papers through the Presidential Recordings and Mate-
rials Preservation Act. The rule established by these decisions was that
141. 1 J. WEISTImn & M. BmER, supra note 3, at viii.
142. Id.; see also infra note 236 and accompanying text.
143. See Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 409; Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 1; see also supra notes 55-
60 and accompanying text & infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
144. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1; see also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
145. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); see also supra notes 68-70 and accom-
panying text.
146. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
147. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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presidential deliberations were presumptively privileged but that, in the right
circumstances, that presumption could be overcome.
The relationship between the Nixon cases and the general deliberative
privilege is, in certain respects, at the heart of the inquiry into whether
there is authority or justification for that privilege. Some will argue that
the Nixon cases authorize the existence of the general deliberative privilege.
I will argue instead, that the privilege approved by these decisions is carefully
and clearly limited to communications involving the President.1 4 I will also
argue that these cases actually support the case against the general delib-
erative privilege. This argument rests on the Court's language about the
costs of granting evidentiary privileges and about the burden that must be
borne by the proponent of such a privilege. I will further argue that these
decisions support the case against the privilege through the position the
Court takes on the separation of powers-that the Constitution does not
require airtight separation and that, in matters involving executive privilege,
the doctrine of the separation of powers cuts both ways. As to the rationale
underlying deliberative privileges-the claim of chilling-the Court in United
States v. Nixon offers clear statements on both sides of the issue and then
takes the position that, whatever else may be true, this claim of injury is
more general, less direct and weaker than that involved in the other forms
of executive privilege that the Court has approved.
J. Summary
The general deliberative privilege is still new to the federal courts. It has
come to those courts from two quite different places. One was the British
House of Lords and the other was Dwight Eisenhower and the ideas about
command and "organizational leadership" that he brought with him to the
White House from a lifetime in the military. These two tributaries joined
at the Court of Claims where the privilege was adopted as a compromise
in the struggle over the modernization of that court's discovery rules and
the elimination of the idiosyncratic, asymmetric advantages that the federal
executive had long enjoyed in that court. In the Court of Claims, the
privilege was propounded by Justice Stanley Reed who thus managed to
accomplish in his retirement what he had never been able to accomplish
during his tenure on the Supreme Court.
The privilege is a product of historical contingencies and of its being in
the right place at the right time. Moreover, it has managed, in all the cases
in which it has been applied, to escape full and careful scrutiny.
148. See infra notes 186-214 and accompanying text.
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE
GENERAL DELIBERATrVE PRIVILEGE
In moving from the history of the general deliberative privilege to its
assessment, I address three topics. The first deals with the law and policy
concerning the assignment of the burden of persuasion in matters of this
kind. The second deals with a series of problems that need to be addressed
concerning the instrumental case in favor of the privilege, i.e., the delib-
erative rationale. And the third assesses the arguments from authority that
are being offered in support of this privilege.
A. The Burden of Persuasion
The broad inquiry of this Article is whether the general deliberative
privilege ought to exist. This inquiry is conducted according to certain
ground rules that are the subject of this section. Among these rules are
those that assign the burden of persuasion and that specify the methods by
which that burden may be satisfied. According to these rules, the burden
of persuasion falls squarely on the proponents of the general deliberative
privilege and the interests they must overcome are of the highest order.
As to the question of burden, Sisella Bok has argued persuasively that
the right to keep secrets is, as a matter of general moral discourse, a right
that requires justification. 149 For its part, the law has made it clear that
privileges impose serious costs and that they are the rare exception, not the
general rule. Thus, in approaching the question of whether there ought to
be a privilege for presidential deliberations, Chief Justice Burger, writing
for a unanimous Court, drew on a stable body of thought when he justified
the Court's caution. Privileges, he explained, derogate the shared interests
in finding truth and doing justice.'5 0 They impair a litigant's fundamental
right to discover and develop all the facts.' They operate to "defeat" the
"ends of ... justice" 152 and diminish "the rule of law."' 5 3 They erode
"[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
system .... ,,5 Therefore, they are not to be "lightly created or expansively
construed." 55
149. S. BOK, SECRETS (1983).
150. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (Nixon 1).
151. Under our adversarial system, the opportunity to discover and develop all the facts is
"both fundamental and comprehensive." Id. at 709.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 708.
154. Id. at 709. Under our adversarial system, "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts." Id.
155. Id. at 710. To express the caution with which the courts have historically approached
questions of privilege, Chief Justice Burger goes on to quote Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
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Accordingly, the right to withhold otherwise discoverable information in
the course of litigation is a right that must be affirmatively justified. A
party who seeks to apply an established privilege to a particular set of
circumstances bears the burden of demonstrating that the application is
warranted."' Similarly, and more to the specific question addressed here,
so does a party who argues that some particular privilege ought to exist.15 7
The burden of persuasion is therefore on the proponent of the privilege to
show that the privilege is of such importance to outweigh these extraordinary
interests.
The proponents of the privilege may discharge their burden in a number
of ways. If the matter is not resolved by statute or rule, it must be resolved
by the courts.'58 Those courts may be persuaded either by instrumental
analysis 5 9 or by arguments from authority. The arguments from authority
may, in turn, rely on some body of law external to the law of judicial
privilege (e.g., sovereign immunity or the separation of powers) or on
someone else's prior approval of the privilege. For present purposes, though,
it is enough to say, first, that the proponents of the general deliberative
privilege bear the burden of winning the argument over whether it ought
to exist and, second, that there are only a limited number of ways in which
that argument might be won.
B. Arguments Based on Instrumental Effects
The purpose of this section is to assess the sufficiency of the instrumental
argument-i.e., the argument based on effects-that is conventionally of-
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960): "Limitations are properly placed upon the
operation of this general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 710 n.18
(quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 234 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
156. 8 C. W iGoT & A. MLLER, supra note 3, § 2016 & n.68.
157. Id.
158. A 1962 Yale Law Journal Note overstates the matter when it asserts that "It]he day
of new judge-made privileges is apparently over" and that privileges will be created or extended
"if at all only through the passage of a statute." Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1229 n.21 (1962).
159. Wigmore provides the classic formulation of the instrumental test. He wrote that a
privilege is properly established only if the proponents of the privilege satisfy the following
conditions:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
8 WIoMoRE, supra note 3, § 2285 (emphasis in original).
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fered in support of the general deliberative privilege. In probing what has
earlier been described as the deliberative rationale, I will first consider
certain matters related to the nature of secrecy. Then I will identify and
assess a series of problems that, in my judgment, demonstrate that the
deliberative rationale is radically incomplete and ultimately unpersuasive.
While this section addresses the instrumental argument that has been offered
in support of the general deliberative privilege, the section that follows will
address the arguments for the privilege that have been made on the basis
of legal authority.
1. On the General Nature of Secrecy
The cases dealing with the general deliberative privilege usually speak of
the decision on whether to disclose particular documents as a technocratic,
value-free judgment. The history of the privilege, however, shows that
people on both sides of the question fully understand that something is at
stake in addition to the technocratic optimization of management practices.
These other dimensions of secrecy are, in fact, well known to all of us
in our own personal and professional lives. For present purposes, I will
reduce them to four propositions. First, information, and the control over
its flow, is power. As Sissela Bok has written, the ability "to hold back
some information about oneself or to channel it and thus influence how
one is seen by others gives power; so does the capacity to penetrate similar
defenses and strategies used by others. ' ' 60 Second, because the control of
information is power, people and organizations systematically seek, as a
matter of self-interest, the right to keep secrets. Thus, Max Weber found
that bureaucratic administrations have inherent in them a drive to enhance
their power by keeping secrets. 61 In light of this self-interest, we should be
160. S. BoK, supra note 149, at 20. She also writes that "[c]onflicts over secrecy-between
state and citizen ... or parent and child, or in journalism or business or law, are conflicts
over power .... Id.
161. He stated that:
[E]very bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally in-
formed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic adminis-
tration always tends to be an administration of "secret sessions": in so far as it
can it hides its knowledge and action from criticism .... The tendency toward
secrecy in certain administrative fields follows their material nature: everywhere
that the power interests of the domination structure toward the outside are at
stake .... we find secrecy.
FRom MAX WEBER: ESSAYS in SocioLoav 233 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946), quoted in B.
LADD, CISIs IN CnRnarry 216-17 (1968).
Bok explains this matter of self-interest in a way that also sheds light on what she sees as
secrecy's inherent tendency to spread:
Aware of the importance of exercising control over secrecy and openness, people
seek more control whenever they can, and rarely give up portions of it voluntarily.
In imitation and in self-protection, others then seek more as well. Control shifts
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at least a little skeptical about the arguments that people and institutions
make about their need or right to keep secrets. This skepticism comes easily
to anyone who has sought or resisted discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Third, there is a strong association between secrecy and
bad acts. Not that secrecy always entails a bad act, but that bad acts always
seek out secrecy. 62 Finally, secrecy operates to alienate-to create subjective
distance between-the secret keeper and the one from whom the secret is
kept. 163 In the public sphere, such alienation between the governed and the
governors tends toward hierarchy and away from democracy and citizen
sovereignty.
In the United States all this combines with a commitment to democracy
and popular self-government and with a strong belief in the virtues of full
and open discourse and well-informed debate. The net effect seems to be a
general, if sometimes contested, preference for openness in government, a
preference that exists without regard for the efficiency costs that may be
entailed.
2. On Whether the Disclosure Causes Chilling
The first problem with the instrumental case in favor of this particular
form of executive privilege is that the central claim of a "chilling" effect
on deliberation is not well established, is easily countered, and is inconsistent
with the way the executive has chosen to conduct its own affairs.
The evidence that has been proffered by the executive is nothing but the
repeated recitation of the bare conclusory assertion that disclosure will cause
in the direction of secrecy ... ; as a result, as Weber pointed out, bureaucracies
and other organizations surround themselves with ever greater secrecy to the
extent that circumstances permit.
S. BOK, supra note 149, at 25.
The literature also contains other support for the notion, implicit in Weber and in Bok,
that bureaucratic organizations-perhaps especially public bureaucracies-are the paradigmatic
seekers after secrecy. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 367.
162. Woodrow Wilson stated the matter clearly, if too strongly, when he argued that
"secrecy means impropriety." Bok argues more moderately that "secrecy breeds corruption,"
that it is "central to the planning of every form of injury to human beings," and that it
"follows malfeasance like a shadow." She clearly does not argue that secrecy is always bad.
Instead, it is her position that "while not all secrets are discreditable, all that is discreditable
and all wrongdoing seeks out secrecy." S. BOK, supra note 149, at 26. Elsewhere she qualifies
the claim that "all" wrongdoing seeks out secrecy. Thus, "[e]very misdeed cloaks itself in
secrecy unless accompanied by such power that it can be performed openly." Id. at 28.
163. This alienation works in both directions. On the one hand, people have powerful
negative feelings about secrets being kept from them. Id. On the other hand, secrets also
operate to alienate the secret-keeper from those from whom the secrets are kept. "[,V]hile
secrecy may heighten a sense of equality and brotherhood among persons sharing the secret,
it can fuel gross intolerance and hatred toward outsiders. At the heart of secrecy lies
discrimination in some form, since its essence is sifting, setting apart, drawing lines." Id. at
28. To similar effect, Bok reports Jung's claim that "the keeping of secrets acts like a psychic
poison, alienating their possessor from the community." Id. at 8.
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chilling. So far as I have been able to determine, the proponents of this
privilege have never offered any kind of formal empirical evidence in support
of its assertion. Nor do the cases or the literature contain so much as a
single specific and verifiable anecdote. Rather, the proponents have confined
themselves to boilerplate recitations of the barest form of the deliberative
rationale. These recitations are drafted by trial lawyers for whom the
discovery dispute is a strategically significant episode in the course of hard-
fought litigation that they have been asked to win. And they are signed by
agency heads who have clear and strong motives for resisting discovery,
quite apart from the fear that future deliberations might be chilled.
But even if we are prepared to assume that the risk of disclosure may
sometimes "chill" future communications, that cannot be the end of our
inquiry. Following Justice Cardozo's lead, we should probably concern
ourselves not with all risks of chilling, but only with the risk that a
reasonable person might be chilled.'6 Moreover, there are distinctions to
be drawn that bear upon the likelihood that any particular risk of disclosure
will chill any particular future communications. In terms of each of these
distinctions-the probability of disclosure, the seriousness of the harm that
disclosure might bring to the speaker, and the speaker's incentives to speak
despite the risks' 6 -the proponents of the general deliberative privilege are
holding the short end of the stick.
The general deliberative privilege involves a probability of future disclo-
sure that is relatively low. It is not concerned with the kind of routine,
almost automatic disclosure that sometimes occurs under the Freedom of
Information Act or that might be expected if, in pursuing an appeal, a
losing litigant were permitted to probe the lower court's deliberations.
Rather, we are concerned with the relatively remote possibility of disclosure
164. The Supreme Court in Nixon I quoted Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking about the secrecy
of jury deliberations, as follows:
A juror of integrity and reasonable firmness will not fear to speak his mind if
the confidences of debate are barred to the ears of mere impertinence or malice.
He will not expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his conduct in the
event that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor. The chance that now and
then there may be found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears and
give way to their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course
of justice.
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 712 n.20 (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933)).
165. The empirical research appears to support two general propositions. The first is that
people are most likely to censor themselves or otherwise modify their behavior under circum-
stances in which either (a) the risk of subsequent, adverse disclosure is high or salient or (b)
the incentive to communicate is weak (as it is in responses to social science surveys). The
second is that people are least likely to censor themselves under circumstances in which either
(a) the risk of subsequent, adverse disclosure is low and non-salient or (b) the incentive to
communicate is significant (as in a work setting in which the speakers have a commitment to
the success of the enterprise or an interest in being seen as useful). See, e.g., Privileged
Communications, supra note 3, at 1472-76.
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in the event that a lawsuit is brought, that it survives dismissal, and that,
absent the privilege, the information in question would be discoverable.
Further, we are dealing with circumstances in which, not only is the
probability of disclosure low, but so, at least as a general matter, is the
risk that would befall the speaker in the event of disclosure. We are not,
for instance, dealing with a criminal defendant who must decide whether
to provide his lawyer with information that, if disclosed, would send him
to jail.
Finally, in thinking about the general deliberative privilege, we are dealing
with circumstances in which the communication that might be chilled is a
communication that the speaker has a clear and strong interest in making.
These are people who are presumed to be committed to the success of the
agency for which they work and who have a strong incentive to help solve
the problems that confront that agency and to get credit for their contri-
butions. Thus, along each of these dimensions, the claim of chilling as a
basis for the general deliberative privilege is on the weakest available ground.
In light of all this, and the proponents' failure to offer evidence that chilling
actually occurs, it is hard to take this argument very seriously.
The implausibility of the claim that chilling occurs is underscored by the
executives' own conduct after leaving office. It is a time-honored and
distinctly American tradition that when high officials of the federal execu-
tive-the higher the better-leave office, they immediately sell to the highest
bidder, for personal profit, their self-serving account of what went on in
the behind-the-scenes deliberations in which they may have played some
part. The bigger and more embarrassing the deliberative secret, the greater
the personal profit. No one, least of all those who have not yet left office,
criticizes the practice in terms of the oft-recited deliberative rationale. When
these authors are criticized, it is not because they have chilled future
deliberations but because they have breached their duty of loyalty by painting
their former teammates as stupid, venal or crazy. Thus, it is common
knowledge that everyone who really matters will, at the earliest possible
moment, publish his account of the deliberations in wlich he was involved.
It is equally well-known that those officials are, even as they engage in
those deliberations, generating contemporaneous records, for use in con-
nection with that publication. It is simply not plausible that an executive
branch that tolerates this extraordinary situation might also believe that the
public interest requires a prohibition against the disclosure, in the course
of formal litigation, of otherwise discoverable information.
3. On Whether Chilling Diminishes the Effectiveness
of the Executive
There are at least three other ways in which granting this privilege may
bear upon the effectiveness of the executive, and all of these ways work in
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the opposite direction to the one that is assumed. The first of these effects
is that chilling, if it occurs, is likely to have a greater effect on "bad"
speaking than on "good" speaking. The first speech to be chilled must
presumably be that speech which would have the most drastically adverse
effects upon the speaker if it were disclosed. This, it seems, would be that
speech which the speaker believes an outsider would perceive as being
against the public interest-including, most particularly, speaking that is
directed toward corrupt or illegal purposes.
The second way in which granting this privilege may diminish the effect-
iveness of the executive is that the privilege enhances the secrecy of executive
deliberations and this secrecy, adopted to maintain the flow of information,
then operates to constrict the flow of information and opinions available
to the decision-maker. Granting the privilege may thus lessen the effective-
ness of the executive's decisionmaking process by depriving the decision-
maker of access to an active, probing, testing, alternative-generating "mar-
ketplace" in ideas.' 66 This argument is recognizable to lawyers, of course,
because it is the bedrock of first amendment jurisprudence. What the
proponents of the general deliberative privilege have so far succeeded in
doing is to make an argument that is persuasive precisely because it takes
this flow-of-ideas jurisprudence, stands it on its head, and asserts it on
behalf of executive secrecy and diminished opportunities for public partic-
ipation and debate.
166. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe in the foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes can safely be carried out.
Id. This idea may also be said to underlie the Supreme Court's declaration in New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), concerning our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at
270; see also J. MmL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
Decisions made in secret may be substantively inferior to those that would have been reached
without the supposed benefit of secrecy but with, instead, the benefit of a widened range of
input and criticism. Bok argues that "secrecy can debilitate judgment and choice." S. BOK,
supra note 149, at 26. More specifically, she explains:
Secrecy can harm those who make use of it in several ways. It can debilitate
judgment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, leading
people to become mired down in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs
and ways of thinking. Neither their perception of a problem nor their reasoning
about it then receives the benefit of challenge and exposure.
Id. at 25.
This is also the assumption that underlies the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). The statutory requirement of an environmental impact statement "is
designed to attract knowledgeable agency comment [from other agencies] on the environmental
issues raised by proposed federal projects." Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621
F.2d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1980).
1990]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
The third way in which granting the privilege may tend to diminish the
effectiveness of the executive involves not the quality of the decisions that
are reached but the ability of the executive to implement those decisions.
My concern here is with the effect that granting this privilege is likely to
have on the legitimacy and credibility of the government in the eyes of its
own citizens. When a government keeps secret the processes by which its
most ordinary decisions are reached or defends itself in court through a
poorly justified form of executive privilege, it uses up some of the respect,
the legitimacy and the credibility on which rests its ability to govern. When
a government is easily persuaded that its interests are more important than
those of the public or when it allows itself to play by different rules than
it requires of its citizens, that government is calling down its most important
account. It is using up some of the readiness to be led which is the
foundation of that government's ability to be taken seriously by its citizens,
to wage war or to collect taxes. That is not to say that granting the general
deliberative privilege is the same as being caught in that first lie about the
U-2 overflight or hiding the truth about the war in Vietnam. The point is
simply that keeping secrets and asserting poorly justified privileges is likely
to have some effect in diminishing public confidence in the integrity of the
government and its commitment to serving the public interest. Thus, it is
likely to have some impact on the executive's ability to govern effectively. 67
The proponents of the general deliberative privilege have argued that
occasional disclosure in the course of litigation will chill future deliberative
communications and thus diminish the effectiveness of the executive. I have,
in this brief section, accepted that assertion but then identified other
plausible ways in which granting the privilege might diminish, not enhance,
the effectiveness of the executive. In the end, even if we grant the proponents
of the privilege the only claim that they have made-that disclosure will
cause chilling-it simply does not follow that disclosure will have a net
adverse effect on the effectiveness of the executive.
4. On Whether Diminished Executive Effectiveness Reflects a Net
Adverse Effect on the Public Interest
Even if we set aside all of the counterarguments that have so far been
made and grant the claim, arguendo, that the risk of disclosure chills future
deliberations and thus has a net adverse effect on the effectiveness of the
executive, it still does not follow that there ought to be a general deliberative
privilege. The reason is that the decision whether to grant this privilege
affects interests other than the executive's and that those other interests




must also be taken into account. Thus, as will be shown, the decision to
grant this privilege will have significant adverse effects on a branch of the
government that is co-equal to the executive, on individual litigants including
those who have perfectly just claims against the government, and on the
principle of citizen sovereignty.
a. Effects on the Judiciary
The claims here granted arguendo not only fall short of warranting the
conclusion that the public interest would be served by establishing a general
deliberative privilege, they even fall short of warranting the conclusion that
such a step would serve the government's interest. The reason is that this
privilege empowers the executive precisely by disempowering the judiciary
and the public interests it serves. Thus, for a unanimous Supreme Court in
United States v. Nixon, Justice Burger explained that one of the reasons
for proceeding cautiously in the matter of the presidential deliberative
privilege was that the granting of such a privilege would be in derogation
of the public's right to every man's evidence, of the search for truth, and
of "our historic commitment to the rule of law. ' 168 He further observed
that privileges operate to defeat "[t]he ends of justice" and that they
threaten "[tihe very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence
in that system. 169 This intrusion upon the ability of the judiciary to do
justice and upon the public's confidence in the system is particularly
168. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 708-10. Questions involving the general deliberative privilege
would not even arise unless a litigant was sufficiently interested in the documents to make the
demand and to litigate the objection. Nor would these questions arise unless all of those who
had drafted and approved the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure agreed that the documents in
question were of such significance that they ought generally to be disclosed to the litigants.
Nor, finally, would the questions arise if the district court did not believe that these documents
were of a kind that ought normally to be disclosed.
Under the discovery rules, the district court judge has broad powers to block discovery on
grounds that are far less problematic and far less susceptible to reversal than the general
deliberative privilege. Thus, he can deny production on grounds that the documents in question
are not sufficiently relevant to the lawsuit, that the discovery request is unduly burdensome,
that it is redundant and unnecessary, etc. He is expected to deny discovery if he believes that
it is being sought not to prepare for trial but to harass the other side into premature settlement.
The likelihood of reversal on any of these grounds is extraordinarily low. As a practical
matter, courts reach questions of privilege only if the question is very easy (e.g., a memo
from a lawyer) or if the court believes that the document is otherwise discoverable.
Discovery is, of course, sometimes sought, and sometimes litigated, for reasons other than
the good faith desire to prepare for trial. These reasons might include the desire to delay the
trial on the merits, to overwhelm the other side's limited staffing capabilities, to spend the
other side into the ground, or to force the other side to choose between giving up the contest
and disclosing information that for some reason it simply cannot disclose.
If the court believes that a litigant is seeking discovery for improper purposes, it has all the
power it might need to respond. Questions of privilege only require resolution if the court
believes that the discovery is being sought in good faith.
169. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 709.
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important because the judiciary-powerful, appointed for life, lacking the
means to implement its own decisions-must have the confidence and respect
both of the public and of individual litigants in order to perform its
constitutionally assigned duties.
b. Effects on Private Litigants
The establishment of the general deliberative privilege has its most direct
effect on individual litigants who are denied access to documents and
testimony that bear closely enough upon their case that, absent the privilege,
discovery would have been permitted. The effects that the privilege is likely
to have on individual litigants include: a diminished likelihood that the
individual will win a case that, absent the privilege, would have been decided
in her favor; a diminished likelihood that she will secure a settlement
consistent with the true strength of her claim; an increase in the cost of the
litigation; and, in the event that she loses, a diminished sense that she has
been treated fairly by the system. One might object and say that, because
this is a qualified privilege and the courts take such matters into account,
it does not operate in a way that affects the outcome of litigation. But this
assumes that the only discovery that matters is that discovery which the
party seeking it could, prior to discovery, demonstrate to be particularly
important. 170 The falsehood of that assumption is well known to litigators
and is deeply embedded in the very structure of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
c. Effects on Citizens and Citizen Sovereignty
Executive secrecy also has a number of effects, almost all bad, on the
power and effectiveness of the citizens who we regard as sovereigns and on
the possibilities that we might realize the ideals of democracy and self-
government.
First, executive secrecy operates to disempower citizens by depriving them
of the information that they may need in order effectively to promote their
interests. This is the core insight underlying the Freedom of Information
Act,' 7' the provisions of the National Environmental Protection Act 72 that
require the issuance of environmental impact statements, and the right-of-
access doctrine that has developed under the first amendment. 73 Specifically,
170. It also assumes that the balance is being struck in such a way that discovery is being
granted whenever the individual litigant has shown that the discovery she seeks may be
important to her case. There is no reason, either in what the courts are saying or in what
they are doing, for assuming this to be true.
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
173. See, e.g., Richmond, 448 U.S. at 555.
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the general deliberative privilege may operate to diminish the level of
information available to citizens on the actual operation of the executive,
on the character or competence of government officials, and on the degree
to which the government is attending to their needs and interests.
Additionally, the establishment of the general deliberative privilege will
operate to diminish the sense of accountability under which executive
officials do their business. That diminished sense of accountability may
increase the likelihood that the official will act in a way that is sloppy or
incompetent, that he will confuse his own self-interest (or that of a particular
constituency) with the interests of the public, or that he will engage in
various kinds of bad acts with which he would not want to be publicly
associated. This may indeed constitute an expansion of the discretion and
prerogatives of the executive, but it is an expansion that is generally contrary
to the interests of the public and to the possibility of democracy based on
citizen sovereignty.
Finally, there is one sense in which the establishment of this privilege
may be said to enhance, not diminish, citizen sovereignty. If we assume
that an executive may have been elected to perform certain tasks that may
have unpleasant dimensions-to fight a war, to identify and prosecute
criminals, to suppress domestic subversion, to deregulate an economy-then
it will sometimes be true that executive secrecy may enhance the power of
the citizens (or some of the citizens) to get done the job that they want
done. But if one looks carefully there are two ways in which this might be
so. In one, I will call these first order effects, our concern is that someone
we all recognize as "the enemy" (the Axis powers, the drug dealer, the
agent of a hostile power) will receive information that will enhance its
ability to foil our collective efforts. There are also second order effects in
which it is the public that must be kept in the dark for fear that, if it knew
all that it might, its consent would be withdrawn. 17 4 The first order effects
are the ones that the Supreme Court has identified as "specific" and that
are all the subject of specific privileges. The general deliberative privilege,
at least insofar as it is not redundant with other, more clearly warranted
privileges, is concerned only with second order effects. While the argument
may be made that the avoidance of these effects may strengthen citizen
174. At least one influential commentator provided what now seems a downright antide-
mocratic justification for executive secrecy. Walter Lippman was concerned to insulate executive
leadership from "mass opinion" and "prevailing public opinion." Thus, he argued that
"[w]here mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true
functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of
the capacity to govern. This breakdown in the constitutional order is the cause of the precipitate
and catastrophic decline of Western society." W. L'PmAN, THE PUBLic PmaosoPHY 20-21,
55, 179 (1955). Arguments of this sort, still being made in the mid-1960s, disappeared in the
wake of the Vietnam debacle.
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sovereignty, it may just as well be said that the avoidance of these effects
strengthens citizen sovereignty only by weakening it.
d. Summary
Even if we assume that disclosure will decrease the effectiveness of the
executive, it does not follow that disclosure will have a net adverse effect
on the public interest as a whole. Granting the privilege will have other
effects-most of them adverse-on the judiciary and thus on the government
as a whole, on the private litigants who would otherwise be entitled to
discovery, and on citizens in general. These effects are, at the highest level
of abstraction, adverse to the possibilities of democracy, citizen sovereignty,
public accountability and justice.
5. On Whether There Are Less Costly Ways of Promoting
Executive Effectiveness and Protecting the Public Interest
The judges and commentators who have approved the general deliberative
privilege structure the issue in terms of whether the government's claim of
necessity is strong enough to warrant approval of the privilege. They have
failed even to consider whether there might be alternative preferable means
of satisfying that claim of necessity. But a showing that the possibility of
disclosure will disserve the public interest cannot logically warrant a grant
of privilege unless the government has also shown-or unless we are prepared
to assume-that the privilege is the only acceptable way of eliminating that
risk to the public interest.
This section explores alternatives to granting the executive its deliberative
privilege, alternatives that would permit disclosure of the disputed documents
for purposes of litigating the particular claim but that might restrict the
disclosure in ways that would eliminate the risk of chilling. I will first
explore the alternatives that are available prior to trial and, then, those that
are available at and after trial.
During pre-trial discovery proceedings, which is where almost all of these
problems arise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that on
motion and for good cause the court may make any discovery-related order
"which justice requires to protect a party or person from ... embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden .... ,,175 This rule is understood to
175. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c). It also explains that these protective orders may specifically
provide:
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions... ,
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated
by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened by order of the
court; [or] (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or




provide the courts with all the power they may need, when good cause is
shown, to close discovery proceedings to outsiders and even to certain
persons connected with the litigation, or to seal the record prior to trial. 176
The most usable example under rule 26(c) is that involving the protection
of trade secrets. 177 The general arrangement in dealing with trade secrets is
that the person opposing discovery must first demonstrate that the infor-
mation is, in fact, confidential commercial information. The party seeking
discovery must then show that the information sought is sufficiently germane
to the litigation that the harm that might be associated with disclosure is,
after account has been taken of the availability of court-imposed protections,
outweighed by the benefits of disclosure. The protective conditions that
may be imposed are "limited only by the needs of the situation and the
ingenuity of court and counsel.' 7 8 The most common orders simply restrict
access to and use of the information that is in question. 79 Such orders
would satisfy virtually all of the interests that may arguably be served by
the general deliberative privilege.
While virtually all contests involving the general deliberative privilege arise
in connection with pre-trial discovery, there also remains the question of
whether there is an alternative to secrecy-through-privilege by which the
trial and its record may be closed to public scrutiny. While there is no
specific rule that grants the court the power to close a trial or limit access
176. See MANUAL FOR ComPIEX LITIGATION § 21.431 (2d ed. 1985). This section explains
that certain objections (the example it uses involves trade secrets):
are typically handled by entry of a protective order. .. .These orders usually
specify that information claimed to be confidential will be provided to opposing
counsel during the discovery process on condition that the information not be
disclosed by them, without court order, except to certain persons for particular
purposes. Counsel receiving confidential materials are generally forbidden from
making disclosures other than at trial or in preparing for trial or settlement. For
example, counsel are ordinarily permitted to disclosfe such information to assistants
in their offices and to potential expert witnesses. Whether disclosure to the clients
themselves is permitted will depend upon the circumstances of the case, balancing
the client's "need to know" for purposes of the litigation against the risks and
consequences of misuse. In any event, those to whom disclosure is made are
usually required to agree in writing to abide by the terms of the order limiting
further disclosure. For additional protection, the information may be sealed or,
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d), exempted from filing with the court.
Id.; see also id. § 41.36 (the Sample Order); 8 C. WIGHT & A. MILER, supra note 3, § 2042
(note particularly Judge Friendly's statement to the effect that he has no doubts about the
constitutionality of such restraints "prior to trial.").
177. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) sets out the general power of the court and lists
eight illustrative types of protective orders that might be issued. The seventh item on that list
refers to orders "that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed in a designated way." Id. There is no reason to
believe that all of the powers available for the protection of trade secrets are not also available
for the preservation of such confidentiality as may be shown necessary to protect the effective
operation of the executive.
178. 8 C. WRIGHr & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2043, at 307.
179. Id. at 315 n.29.
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to its record-Rule 26 applies only to discovery-there is no question but
that, within certain limits, the courts possess this authority. The limits in
question are constitutional and they may arise in terms either of a right to
a public trial or of a right of access arising from a first amendment right
to receive information. The "public trial" question is easily answered
because the sixth amendment, which sets out that right, applies only to
criminal trials.5 0 As to the first amendment, it seems clear that, though the
matter may not be so easily dismissed at trial as it is during the discovery
stage, 18 existing law will allow a limited closure of a civil trial on the basis
of a persuasive showing of need.8 2 Thus, at all relevant stages of the
180. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a ... public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. No comparable right exists
regarding civil litigation.
181. The first amendment constitutionality of orders protecting the confidentiality of material
disclosed in the course of pretrial discovery was tested in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20 (1984). Such restrictions are undeniably a prior restraint on free speech. In re Halkin,
598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Nevertheless the Court, in Seattle Times, concluded that these
orders do not fall within the prohibition of the first amendment. In this defamation suit
against a newspaper, the defendant sought certain discovery that the court granted subject to
a protective order. The order provided that:
The defendants.., shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the [subject]
information... which is gained through discovery, other than such use as is
necessary in order for the discovering party to prepare and try the case....
[I]nformation gained by a defendant through the discovery process may not be
published by any of the defendants or made available to any news media for
publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to
information... gained through the use of discovery processes.
Id. at 27 n.8. The defendant newspaper claimed that this order violated its first amendment
right to disseminate the information.
The Court unanimously rejected the defendant's argument. In so doing, it explained that,
whatever the publicness of civil trials, discovery is not a public component of the civil justice
system and that different rules may apply when the person seeking to disseminate information
has secured that information only through legislative grace and state power operating through
the discovery rules. Id. at 32. The Court then held that:
where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause
as required by Rule 26c, is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources, it does not offend the first amendment.
Id. at 37.
Note, in connection with this case, that the language about the order being limited to the
pretrial context does not mean that the order does not extend beyond trial. It does. But the
order does not, without more, seal the trial record.
182. Here we find guidance in Richmond, 448 U.S. at 555. There a trial court had closed
a criminal murder trial without a hearing, without findings and without giving considerations
to other means of protecting the interests that might be served by closure. A local newspaper
objected and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's closure order. It did so on the basis
of its conclusions that criminal trials are historically and presumptively open, that the first
amendment includes a right to listen and receive information, and that the trial court had
paid insufficient attention-indeed no attention at all-to the effect that its ruling would have
on the first amendment rights of third parties. Id. at 569-77. The Court clearly pointed out,
though, that, even in connection with criminal trials, the first amendment rights of third
parties are not absolute and countervailing interests may warrant limited closures. Id. at 576,
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proceedings, the courts have at hand the tools by which they can grant
discovery of the otherwise discoverable deliberative documents and, when
the circumstances warrant, still keep the documents in question from be-
coming available to the general public. This possibility has dramatic con-
sequences for the debate over the general deliberative privilege. In one
stroke, it eliminates virtually the entire case in favor of this privilege.'83
The claim in favor of this privilege is that the risk of disclosure causes
chilling which, in turn, causes such injury as warrants the approval of the
privilege. Without disclosure, the entire argument disappears. The question
then is whether the argument has any strength when disclosure of the
deliberative communications is confined to the litigants and the court. Here
it may be useful to distinguish between two kinds of chilling that sometimes
occur. One is the chilling that occurs when, in an attempt to accomplish a
goal that everyone shares, we say something that, if disclosed, might seem
stupid or unwise and thus subject us to a kind of public ridicule. The other
occurs when, in pursuit of a purpose that is known to be corrupt or illegal,
someone says something which, once disclosed, gives rise to public condem-
nation and perhaps also to liability. While both kinds of disclosures can be
embarrassing, it is my experience as a litigator that a client's embarrassment
at the second kind of disclosure is by far the more acute. In the presence
of a protective order like the ones routinely provided for the protection of
trade secrets, the only risk that remains is the risk of this second kind of
embarrassment. But the chilling that might result from a fear of that kind
of embarrassment is precisely not the sort of chilling that warrants the
protection of a judicial privilege.
6. Summary
On reflection, it seems clear that the instrumental argument in favor of
the general deliberative privilege is a great deal weaker than everyone-
courts, commentators and lawyers alike-seems to have assumed. First, the
deliberative rationale rests on the conclusory and unverified assertions of
581 n.18.
But the question with which we are concerned is not the permissibility of a full closure of
a criminal trial without consideration to the costs of closure. We are instead concerned with
the availability of a limited closure in a civil trial on the basis of what we assume will have
been a persuasive showing of need. Richmond tells us that, even in criminal proceedings,
limited closures may be permissible in response to precisely the sort of "need" that we are
assuming the government can show. Id. And the standards for criminal proceedings can only
be higher for criminal than for civil proceedings because criminal trials are subject to the sixth
amendment and to a strong presumption that they shall be public. This presumption does not
extend to civil trials.
183. It also narrows, but does not eliminate, some of the arguments that might otherwise
be made against the privilege, those being the arguments that rely on the benefits associated
with open government.
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interested parties and has never been supported by anything that might
fairly be called evidence. It is unpersuasive in light of the relevant circum-
stances (contingent disclosure, low embarrassment, strong incentive to speak
fully) and inconsistent with the ways in which the executive has otherwise
chosen to conduct its affairs.
Second, even if it is assumed that disclosure may chill future deliberations,
it" does not follow that disclosure disserves the executive. The conclusion
does not follow from the assertion because disclosure has other, counter-
vailing effects that must be, but have not been, taken into account.
Third, even if it is assumed that disclosure may chill future deliberations
and will do a net disservice to the executive, one cannot conclude that
disclosure disserves either the government as a whole or the public interest.
The assumption does not warrant the conclusion because the choice between
privilege and disclosure has effects elsewhere in the system that work, at
the very least, to offset the assumed effects on the executive. These other
effects bear upon the effectiveness of the judiciary, the constitutional system
of checks and balances, the interests of litigants and the possibilities of
justice, accountability and democracy.
Finally, even if it is assumed that disclosure chills future deliberations,
that it does a net disservice to the executive, and that it does a net disservice
to the government as a whole and to the public interest, it still does not
follow that there ought to be a general deliberative privilege. Here again,
the assumption does not warrant the conclusion because of what has been
left out of consideration. This time, what has not been taken into account
is the availability of procedural alternatives that are sufficient to protect
the executive's legitimate interest, but that are far less disadvantageous than
granting a privilege.
Therefore, the instrumental argument in favor of the general deliberative
privilege is far weaker than has been assumed, the costs associated with
granting the privilege are greater and more numerous than have been
admitted, and the availability of less costly alternatives has never been taken
into account. More narrowly to the point, the argument is altogether
unpersuasive and insufficient to carry the burden that the proponents of
this privilege must bear.
C. Arguments Based on Authority
The second set of arguments made on behalf of the general deliberative
privilege rely not upon claims concerning instrumental effects but rather on
claims related to various sources of authority. These arguments from au-
thority have taken a number of different forms. The Kaiser decision in the
Court of Claims 8 4 relied on precedent in the British House of Lords and
184. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since Kaiser, the general federal courts
have relied on the Kaiser decision, the separation of powers doctrine, the
Morgan doctrine in administrative law, exemption five of the Freedom of
Information Act and the cases decided under that statutory provision, federal
evidence rule 509 as it was proposed to and rejected by the Congress, and
the now considerable accumulation of decisions in which the lower federal
courts have approved or applied the privilege.
I begin this section by considering the two core arguments, those relying
on the separation of powers and on the Morgan doctrine. I will then
examine the arguments that rely on sovereign immunity, the Freedom of
Information Act, proposed evidence rule 509 and stare decisis.185
1. The Separation of Powers
The basis for the general deliberative privilege is often said to be the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 86 The argument is that the
occasional disclosure of general deliberative materials in the 'course of a
judicial proceeding would be an unconstitutional interference with or intru-
sion upon the executive branch. The principal claim is that the occasional
disclosure of these materials will chill future deliberative communications
and thus diminish and in that sense interfere with the effectiveness of the
executive in performing the substantive duties that he is assigned under the
Constitution.I 7 Whatever may be the case with regard to presidential delib-
185. The arguments that are based on precedent in the House of Lords and then in the
Court of Claims are of chiefly historical interest (Kaiser has been cited countless times. See,
e.g., Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981); McClelland v. Andrus,
606 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)). Apart from what has already been said-namely, that these claims of
authority were weak but nevertheless important to the process by which this authority was
carried into the federal courts-these arguments will not be subjected to further consideration.
186. See, e.g., Black v. Sheraton Corp of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Black
II); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp.
at 581, 585, 588; Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 966, 972 (Cust. Ct. 1978);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 327 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub
nom. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952
(1967) (government asserts general deliberative privilege on the basis of separation of powers;
court affirms the privilege without relying on the constitutional argument).
187. Some have also asserted that the control of executive documents is itself an executive
function that the judiciary is not permitted to usurp. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 515 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Nixon I). This argument,
however, proves too much. If compulsory judicial process were a usurpation of executive
functions, then the same would be true of such unquestionably constitutional statutes as the
Freedom of Information Act.
Burger's response to these examples is to suggest that those statutes are directed only to
those parts of the executive branch that are creatures of the legislature and that they are,
therefore, constitutionally permissible while process or legislation directed at the Presidency is
not. Id. Even if his argument is correct, it would not be an argument in favor of the general




erations, this argument is unpersuasive in its application to the non-presi-
dential materials that come within the scope of the general deliberative
privilege.
The argument usually begins with the assertion that the executive has the
constitutional power to keep order in its own house, to control its own
documents, to keep certain kinds of secrets and, most narrowly, to keep
secrets of the kind that are here at issue.1 s8 If these powers do exist, and
many of them certainly do, they exist by implication for they are not among
the enumerated powers of the executive. In this respect, the claim of
executive privilege rests on weaker ground than the claim of legislative
privilege.8 9 If these powers exist by implication, they do because they are
necessary to or useful in the executive's performance of his constitutionally
assigned responsibilities. 190 Thus, the narrow claim that the executive has
188. The Nixon I Court stated:
Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential commu-
nications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive
from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional
duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers;
the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar
constitutional underpinnings.
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705-06 (footnote omitted). The Nixon II Court further stated: "Control
of Presidential papers is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad discretion
vested in the President in order for him to discharge his duties." Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 515(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice went further and asserted that the legislation in
question was "an exercise of executive-not legislative-power by the Legislative Branch" in
that "it [was] an attempt by Congress to exercise powers vested exclusively in the President-
the power to control files, records, and papers of the office." Id. at 506, 514; see also Nixon
I, 418 U.S. at 703-15 (treatment of article II powers may simply be as predicate for separation
of powers argument); Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-
1960, 29 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 827, 899-900 (1961) (dealing with executive privilege to withhold
information from Congress); "The Present Limits of 'Executive Privilege,"' Government and
General Research Division, Library of Congress 3 (1973) (dealing with executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress).
189. The Constitution expressly provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House,"
the "Senators and Representatives . . . shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Constitution makes no such provision for any form of executive
or presidential privilege. The Supreme Court has held that "the silence of the Constitution on
this score is not dispositive" of whether there might be a constitutionally based executive
privilege. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 706 n.16.
190. In Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705 n.16, the Court cites McCuloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 163 (1819), for the proposition that the President may have certain powers that are
not enumerated but implied. The Court appears to suggest that the criterion for implying
legislative powers under article I ("that which was reasonably appropriate and relevant to the
exercise of a granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant") would also
apply to problems involving implication of executive powers under article II. Id.
Professor Van Alstyne has written that "surely the reference to McCulloch v. Maryland [in
footnote 16 of Nixon I, supra] did not mean to read into article II an implied equivalent of
the necessary-and-proper clause ... in article I." Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional
Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. Ray. 116, 118-19 (1974) [hereinafter Van
Alstyne, Constitutional Review]. It is his view that the range of powers that may be implied
on behalf of the executive is substantially narrower than the range of powers that may be
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the power to keep general deliberative secrets'91 is no stronger than the
instrumental argument that the general deliberative privilege promotes the
effectiveness of the executive, a claim that has already been found to be
weak. 19 But even if this power exists it is the beginning, not the end, of
analysis under the separation of powers.
If the separation of powers question is not settled by arguments over the
scope of the executive's powers, it is also not settled by United States v.
Nixon.193 There, the Supreme Court found a qualified privilege for presi-
dential deliberations and that this qualified privilege rests in part on the
separation of powers.194 But the Court also made it clear that it was dealing
with an assertion of presidential privilege, that it mattered that the executive
official in question was the President, and that, in important respects, it
regarded the President as standing apart from the rest of the executive
branch in matters of this kind.' 95 In any event, the Court went out of its
way to make it clear that it was not dealing with what I am calling the
general-that is, by definition, a non-presidential-deliberative privilege.
Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that there might be one
rule, the Nixon rule, for the President and another, less deferential rule for
his underlings. The first of these reasons is that a court would not be
tempted, as the United States v. Nixon Court clearly and properly was, to
approve the claim of privilege simply out of respect for and deference to
the high office of the presidency.'1 Second, there is a clear sense in which
the President is, together with the Vice President, constitutionally distinct
from other members of the executive branch. These two offices stand on a
different constitutional footing because they are the only executive offices
that are expressly created by the Constitution.19 All other offices of the
implied on behalf of the legislature. Id.; see also Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on
the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAw & CoNTEMw. PROES. 102 (Spring 1976);
see also 3 J. STORY, CommENTARIs oN ma CoNs-TTuToN oF THE UwrraD STATEs, § 1563, at
418-19 (Ist ed. 1833) (quoted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (Nixon II1)
("There are... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily
implied from the nature of the functions which are confided to it.").
191. It is useful to distinguish between (a) the power to keep secrets that is common to all
autonomous entities in the absence of an authoritative demand and (b) the power to keep
secrets in the face of an otherwise authoritative demand. Only the second of these is usefully
regarded as a constitutional power.
192. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
193. 418 U.S. at 683.
194. Id. at 703-07.
195. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
196. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 683; Nixon III, 457 U.S. at 753 ("[Ihe President's status is
unique among executive officials and United States v. Nixon saw that unique status as a factor
'counseling judicial deference and restraint."').
197. Nixon III, 457 U.S. at 749-52 (arguing, for instance, that "[tihe President occupies a
unique position in the constitutional scheme"); see also Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 508 (Burger,
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executive branch are, at least in some respect, creatures of the legislature. 98
It would be surprising if this constitutional distinction did not make some
difference in the application of the separation of powers doctrine.'9 The
third reason is that the President is functionally distinct from other members
of the executive branch in ways that bear upon the question of this privilege.
On this basis the Supreme Court has decided that the President enjoys a
higher level of immunity from civil suit than do his advisors, the members
of his cabinet and most other members of the executive branch. 2°
Moreover, the Constitution does not require airtight separation of the
branches. 20 1 The Supreme Court has "squarely rejected the argument that
C.J., dissenting) (President stands on "a very different footing"; only he and the Vice
President were mandated by the Constitution; all other executive officials are "creatures of
the Congress"); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 573, 596, 626, 635-36, 639-40 (1984).
198. See Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 508 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Strauss, supra note 197, at
596, 626, 635-36, 639-40.
199. In Nixon III, 457 U.S. at 731, the constitutional distinction between the President and
other members of the executive branch was found to help warrant granting the President a
higher level of immunity from civil suit than was granted to most other officials of the
executive branch. Professor Strauss argues that the constitutional distinction between the
President and other executive officials warrants granting to the President a greater measure of
protection under the separation of powers doctrine than is granted to his subordinates. Strauss,
supra note 197, at 625-29.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Nixon II argued that a statute controlling the disposition
of executive papers might be constitutional when applied to subordinate executive officials but
unconstitutional when applied to the President. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 504 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
200. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (functional analysis; presidential advisors
warrant less protection than the President); Nixon III, 457 U.S. at 731; Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978) (prosecutors, adjudicators warrant special protection).
201. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 674 (1988); Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 442-43; Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 707; THE FEDERA=S1 No. 47 (A.
Hamilton) (H. Cabot Lodge ed. 1904):
Montesquieu did not mean that these departments [the legislative and the exec-
utive] ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each
other. His meaning, as his own words import ... can amount to no more than
this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Id. at 301-02 (emphasis in original); Stauss, supra note 197, at 573.
While there have been cases that have relied on strict separationist arguments, those cases
have involved issues of usurpation that are not present in cases involving assertions of executive
privilege. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In the privilege cases, the
judiciary is performing an undeniably judicial function, the performance of which may bear
upon the activities of another branch. These questions of involved interference without
usurpation cannot be resolved through strict separationism.
The other "bright line" cases under the separation of powers involve the interpretation of
textual provisions of a kind that have bearing on executive privilege. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983); J. NowAK, R. ROTuNDA & J. YouNG, CONsTrrTIoNAL LAW 121 (1983):
[W]hile the Constitution created separate executive, legislative, and judicial de-
partments, there was no clear delineation between their functions. Instead, the
drafters of the Constitution sought to establish a system of checks and balances
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the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the
three Branches ' 20 2 or that the Government "operate with absolute
independence'"'2 and has approved the characterization of the argument
for "airtight departments" as "archaic. '" 4 It has declared that the Con-
stitution does not require "a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another." '2 5 To this effect, the Court has repeatedly
approved Justice Jackson's statement that "while the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. ' '20,
Thus, if the asserted intrusion of one branch upon another is to violate the
separation of powers doctrine, it must be significant and unwarranted.2
The claim that there might be some intrusion-in this case, that there might
be a diminishment in the effectiveness of the executive-is not, standing
alone, sufficient.
Moreover, this is a case in which the separation of powers cuts both
ways. This constitutional doctrine is no less concerned with protecting the
judiciary from intrusions by the executive than it is with protecting the
executive from the judiciary. 20s Granting the privilege would, according to
between the branches of government to ensure the political independence of each
branch and to prevent the accumulation of power in a single branch. Today, we
may not recognize that the system of "checks and balances" runs counter to a
separation of functions concept, but that was clearly realized at the time of the
Revolution.
Id.
202. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 443.
203. Id. (emphasis deleted) (quoting Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 707).
204. Id.
205. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
206. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring), quoted with approval in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122;
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 707.
207. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-96.
208. The independence and co-equality of the judiciary is central to our constitutional design.
Thus, Judge Irving Kaufman, writing in the Columbia Law Review, has explained that:
[h]aving scarcely emerged from the shadow of a tyrannical Parliament, and with
ever increasing examples of legislative excess throughout the states, the Framers
understood that the security of individual rights could be preserved only if the
legislative and executive powers were kept within the limits prescribed by a higher,
fundamental law. Recognizing the dangers inherent in unbounded power, the
Founders went beyond the legacy of British and colonial history and adopted a
written constitution with an independent judiciary for its guardian. The Framers
realized, moreover, that their bold experiment could succeed only if the judicial
power were kept absolutely separate and distinct from the executive and legislative
branches. If it were not, the Constitution's promise of a government of limited
powers could be broken with utter impunity. The solution was thus to elevate
the judiciary to a third, co-equal branch of government, whose authority flowed
directly from the same constitutional wellspring as its sister branches .... It is
this additional step, inconceivable in England, that made the American Consti-
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the unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, intrude upon the efficacy
of the judiciary and upon the performance of its constitutionally-assigned
duty to do "justice." It would derogate "the search for truth" in the
individual case;210 it would tend to defeat "the ends of ... justice"; 211 it
would diminish "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system"; 212 and it would
put at issue "our historic commitment to the rule of law." 213 Accordingly,
"[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts
that compulsory process be available ... .,"214 Thus, the decision whether
tution truly revolutionary.
Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 CoLiuM. L. Rav. 686 (1980); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 201, at 484 (the judiciary is the weakest of the departments
of government; it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by the
other branches; and its "complete independence" is "peculiarly essential in a limited Consti-
tution.").
209. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 712-13. Professor Ratner explains that the executive's need to
keep secrets must compete "with the constitutional function of the judiciary to resolve 'cases
and controversies,' including federal criminal prosecutions.... This constitutional 'duty to do
justice' may imply judicial- authority to require all evidence that assists in truth ascertainment"
and the "[w]ithholding of relevant evidence manifestly interferes with judicial truth ascertain-
ment." Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers Illusion,
22 UCLA L. REv. 92, 95 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Van Alstyne ignores the language of the decision and argues as if the case did
not involve any threatened intrusion upon the constitutional responsibilities of the judiciary.
Van Alstyne, Constitutional Review, supra note 190, at 116. Not only does he refrain from
acknowledging that aspect of the Court's reasoning, but he repeatedly refers to the case as
one "solely" involving "executive interests." Id. at 119, 121, 133. He supports this with his
assertion that "the judiciary has no separate superintending authority as to what cases shall
be brought by the executive, or what evidence shall be sought by the executive." Id. at 134.
The applicability of this argument to the Nixon I case depends, however, upon his further
claim that Nixon had, by resisting the subpoena, exercised his power to advise the Court that
the executive "does not seek" this evidence. The Court expressly rejected that argument when
it concluded that the executive had neither amended nor revoked the delegation by which it
had expressly granted the Special Prosecutor the power to contest assertions of executive
privilege. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 695. What remains at issue, then, is the interest of the
executive-properly delegated to the Special Prosecutor-and, as the Court has suggested, the
constitutionally-assigned duty of the courts to "do justice" in matters that are properly before
it.
210. Nixon 1, 418 U.S. at 710.
211. Id. at 709.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 708.
214. Id. at 709 (emphasis added). To be sure, the Nixon I case involved a criminal proceeding
and not a civil suit of the kind that is likely to present the general deliberative privilege. But
Burger's argument cannot depend on this fact. The constitutional status of criminal and civil
proceedings differ only in the sense that the Constitution assures certain rights to criminal
defendants. In Nixon 1, it was the prosecutor who was seeking the documents. But see Nixon
II1, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37 (The Court has recognized that there is a lesser public interest in




to grant the general deliberative privilege involves two questions, not one,
in connection with the separation of powers. The first involves the serious-
ness of the intrusion that the risk of occasional disclosure might impose on
the executive. The other, no less important, involves the seriousness of the
intrusion that granting the privilege might impose on the judiciary.
Against these legal standards, all that is offered by the proponents of
this privilege is the assertion that the occasional disclosure of deliberative
materials in the course of litigation may chill future deliberative commu-
nications which may, in turn, diminish the effectiveness of the executive.
But that is not enough. This claim has already been shown to be speculative
and unpersuasive. Moreover, there is reason to believe that disclosure, and
even certain forms of chilling, may actually enhance the effectiveness of
the executive. Not only can this risk of diminished effectiveness be avoided
through the issuance of protective orders, but regardless, the intrusion upon
the executive is no greater than the intrusion upon the judiciary that would
result from granting this privilege. The net intrusion on the executive is
both reasonable and warranted by the standards of a Constitution that
envisions a certain amount of "interdependence" and "reciprocity" between
the branches of the government.
In accepting the implications of this conclusion, we would be left with a
set of rules that would be almost symmetrical to those that the Supreme
Court has fashioned in the closely related area of executive immunity from
civil litigation; As with executive immunity, distinctions would be drawn
within the executive branch. As with immunity, the President and certain
others-including those whose responsibilities are quasi-judicial-would en-
joy a level of protection that is markedly higher than the protection afforded
other officers and employees of the executive branch. And as with immunity,
these distinctions and this higher level of protection might be justified on
the basis of the special constitutional status of the President and the special
"functional" characteristics of the protected offices. United States v. Nixon
would provide a privilege for presidential deliberations and the Morgan
cases would provide a privilege for quasi-judicial deliberations within the
executive. Beyond those two, there would be no privilege for "general"
deliberations. Outside the realm of the "deliberative" privileges, the other
forms of executive privilege would remain unimpaired.
2. The Morgan Doctrine in Administrative Law
A great many cases and commentaries have argued that authority for the
general deliberative privilege is found in the Morgan cases.25 Thus, we are
215. International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827
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told, again and again, that the Morgan Court accepted the government's
contention that "it was not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the Secretary ' 21 6 and that "[j]ust as a judge cannot be subjected
to such a scrutiny, . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must
be equally respected." 217
The problem with this claim is that the Morgan decisions218 represent a
category of cases that are analytically and functionally distinct from those
that fall within the realm of the general deliberative privilege. Thus, Morgan
approves not the privilege that is here at issue, but, instead, something that
I shall provisionally call the "quasi-judicial deliberative privilege." To be
specific, the Court was dealing with the deliberations of a cabinet secretary
who had been expressly charged by Congress with performing "adjudicatory
functions. ' 21 9 The proceeding before the Secretary had resembled a "judicial
proceeding" m and he had actually "dealt with the enormous record in a
manner not unlike the practice of judges."' 22 As to the nature of the
proceeding, the Court had previously observed that it "had all the essential
elements of contested litigation, with the Government and its counsel on
the one side and the appellants and their counsel on the other.' 222 Moreover,
the Secretary's decision was subject to appeal in the same way as would
have been the decision of a lower court. Accordingly, the Court regarded
the proceedings as those of a "collaborative instrumentalit[y] of justice"
and gave the Secretary the same deference, respect and immunity it would
have given to another court m
The cases and commentaries that rely on Morgan as authority for the
general deliberative privilege are generally written as if this language about
the quasi-judicial nature of the Secretary's activities simply was not a part
(1971); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1966)
(deliberations of a "quasi-adversary" are more in need of protection than are those of a judge
or jury; court ignored availability of attorney-client privilege); NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills,
106 F.2d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 1939) (applies Morgan privilege to the deliberations of the "quasi-
adversary NLRB"); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 18
(7th Cir. 1984); In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 581; Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 972-
73, 976; Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946; Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 325 ("the
judiciary is not authorized 'to probe the mental processes' of an executive or administrative
officer"); Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ("mhe cerebrations
and mental processes of government officials, leading to admittedly proper exercises of power,
can never be a factor in a judicial proceeding and, therefore, need not be disclosed."); see
also Montrose Chem. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FOIA exemption five).
216. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (Morgan I).
217. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Morgan IV).
218. I will refer to the four Morgan decisions collectively as Morgan unless a particular
decision is specifically identified.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.; Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936) (Morgan 1).
222. Morgan 1I, 304 U.S. at 20.




of the Court's opinion. But that language is so central to the opinion that
the proponents of the privilege must do something more than simply
announcing, without explanation, that Morgan authorizes their position.
They might, for instance, try to show that the Court had no interest in the
quasi-judicial nature of the activities in question and that this language
imposes no restriction upon the reach of these decisions. Or they might
argue that they are applying Morgan correctly because the Morgan Court
used the language of "adjudication" and of "quasi-judicial" activities in a
way that properly applies to all executive decisiomnaking. But both of these
arguments could, if made, be easily dismissed.2 4 More interestingly, they
might argue that the Court has extended the Morgan doctrine, perhaps
through Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,2 in ways that render
it applicable to all executive decisions-or that the policies at work in
Morgan warrant extension of the doctrine to all executive decisions. These
last two arguments require closer examination.
Like Morgan, Overton Park dealt with the decision of a cabinet secretary
who had been directed by Congress to resolve a dispute in accordance with
specified criteria.n The Secretary in Overton Park made his decision on
the basis of a full administrative record that reflected the views of advocates
on both sides of the question on which the Secretary was required to pass.
He did not, at the time of the decision, provide any statement of his
reasons? 27 The Court concluded, in this connection, that he had been under
224. "Quasi-judicial" was a term that, at the time of the Morgan decisions, can fairly be
said to have had two meanings. One was the meaning given to it in separation of powers
cases like Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). There the terms quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative were used to distinguish the activities of certain independent
agencies from the kind of constitutionally "executive" activities that could not be removed
from the control of the executive branch. In Humphrey's Executor, for instance, the statutorily
independent Federal Trade Commission was declared to be a "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-
legislative" agency and thus "wholly disconnected from the executive department." Accord-
ingly, Congress could limit the causes for which the President could remove a commissioner
without violating the separation of powers. Id. Since the decisionmaker in Morgan was not a
member of some independent agency but was the Secretary of Agriculture, the Supreme Court
in Morgan could not have meant "quasi-judicial" to have this constitutional meaning. Rather,
it appears that the Court used the term to describe someone who was charged with doing the
kind of job that judges do, who was doing it in the way that judges do it, and who was
doing it subject to the kind of appellate review that judges receive.
I can imagine no plausible interpretation of "quasi-judicial" that might justify understanding
that term to encompass the full range of executive decisions. Nor can I imagine a defensible
reading of the Morgan decisions that would not take account of this aspect of the Court's
opinion.
225. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). I am discussing the Morgan decisions precisely because numerous
lower federal courts have relied upon them as authority for the general deliberative privilege.
The question with which I am concerned is whether that reliance is warranted. It would be
boot-strapping of the worst kind to assert that these courts were warranted in their reliance
on Morgan because Morgan has been extended to authorize this privilege-and that Morgan
has been extended to authorize this privilege because these courts have said that it does.
226. Id. at 405, 411.
227. Id. at 408.
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no obligation to provide such a statement.2 At the same time, however,
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to "effective" judicial
review of the Secretary's decision. It further found that, while "inquiry
into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be
avoided," 29 such an inquiry might here be necessary to assure an effective
review2310 The Court made it clear that this necessity, if it existed, was
closely related to-if indeed it did not arise expressly from-the Secretary's
wholely lawful failure to provide formal and contemporaneous fmdings.?'
But this does not warrant the conclusion that Overton Park extends
Morgan across the entire range of executive decisionmaking. Overton Park
is still, in its own way, quasi-judicial and its holding, after all, is that the
Morgan privilege may not apply in the absence of formal and contempo-
raneous findings.
However, if we are to conclude that Morgan and its progeny still do not
apply across the full range of the general deliberative privilege, where, one
might ask, ought the boundary be drawn? It appears that, this boundary
ought to be drawn in terms of the role that the federal court-or, more
precisely, the lowest federal court to whom the matter is presented-is asked
to play in connection with the particular executive decisions the deliberations
over which are at issue. There are two possibilities. Either, first, that court
will have the relationship to the executive that a trial court normally has
to a party or, second, that court will have the appellate relationship that a
higher tribunal normally has to a lower one. In both cases, of course, the
entry-level federal court sits as a part of a continuous, hierarchic structure
for the framing, winnowing and resolving of disputes. The difference is
that when the federal court sits as a trial court it serves as the first step in
that decisional structure while, when it sits in an appellate capacity, it serves
as an upper-level tribunal in a continuous, hierarchical decisional structure
that begins within the federal executive.
In drawing this distinction, there are two things that must be kept in
mind. First, we are concerned with the nature of the relationship between
the federal executive and the first federal court to which the matter is
presented. That first court may be either the district court or the court of
228. Id. at 409, 417-19.
229. Id. at 420.
230. Id.
231. The Court's opinion stated:
[W]here there are administrative findings that were made at the same time as the
decision, as was the case in Morgan, there must be a strong showing of bad
faith or improper behavior before such an inquiry may be made [into the mental
processes of administrative decisionmakers]. But here there are no such formal
findings and it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review
is by examining the decisionmakers themselves.
Vol. 65:845
GENERAL DELIBERATIVE PRIVILEGE
appeals. 32 Second, at least for purposes of this distinction, the relationship
of de novo review-as, for example, a district court may have with regard
to the decision of a magistrate-is an appellate relationship. Whatever may
be their differences with respect to procedures and formalities, Morgan and
Overton Park both involved the power of entry-level federal courts sitting
in an appellate relationship to the executive decisionmaker whose delibera-
tions the court had been asked to probe. That, I assert, is the proper realm
of the Morgan doctrine.23
This distinction between trial (non-appellate) and appellate proceedings
becomes important when we recognize that all appellate tribunals must have
some set of rules concerning the scope and standard of review and, more
generally, the degree of deference and respect to be afforded the lower
tribunal. Under this reading, Morgan and Overton Park are properly un-
derstood as providing one such rule as to the deference that a federal court
ought afford to an administrative tribunal whose work that court is reviewing
in a appellate capacity. Thus, the lower tribunal-in these cases the cabinet
secretaries-enjoys a presumption of regularity not because they work for
the executive, but rather because the Supreme Court has, in a way that is
entirely consistent with our normal practice, incorporated that presumption
into this particular appellate system. Morgan and Overton Park thus specify
forms of deference that are like, in general kind, the deference that a court
of appeals might show in reviewing the work of a district court trial judge.
Thus, the administrators in Morgan and Overton Park are like judges, not
just in the way they might process disputes but also, and perhaps more
importantly, in their relationship to the reviewing court. They are, in that
sense, quasi-judicial instrumentalities of justice. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has declared that they warrant deference and respect of the kind that
an appellate court would normally show to a trial court.
With these observations in mind, there are two conclusions that may be
drawn. One, technically beyond the scope of this Article, 214 is that, within
232. The entry-level federal court for the judicial "review" of administrative actions may
be either the district court or the court of appeals. As the terms are here being used, the
district courts will sometimes sit in an appellate capacity and sometimes in a non-appellate
capacity.
233. If the Morgan rule is no more than a part of the structure of deference that an
appellate tribunal owes to a subordinate one, then we would expect the deference to extend
no more broadly than the deliberations of subordinate tribunals within the continuous,
hierarchic decisional structure that has led to the federal court. Even in cases where the entry-
level federal court sits in an administrative capacity, issues will sometimes arise about the
permissibility of probing some executive deliberation that is the subject of the original dispute
or that is otherwise a deliberation external to the chain of appeals. Such an issue would fall
outside of the Morgan doctrine as I am proposing it be understood.
234. The general deliberative privilege is one that exists even in the absence of any special
or "specific" justification. When the federal executive claims that particular circumstances
warrant a privilege and the courts reject that claim, the executive still may argue that the case
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the realm that I have characterized as "appellate," there are distinctions to
be drawn that bear upon the exact level of deference that the courts might
be expected to show to the executive. Such was the distinction that the
Supreme Court drew when in Overton Park it announced that the Morgan
doctrine would not apply, at least in its original strong form, in the judicial
review of a cabinet secretary's decision reached in the course of what the
Administrative Procedure Act denominates as informal adjudication. 235 The
in question comes within the general deliberative privilege. Thus, any time a specific privilege
(e.g., that protecting the identity of informers, state secrets or quasi-judicial deliberations) is
either rejected or narrowed, the realm within which the general deliberative privilege exists is,
at least potentially, expanded. While the exact scope of the executive's other privileges bears
in this way upon the scope of the general deliberative privilege, no attempt will be made here
to pronounce upon the exact scope of all such privileges.
235. Within the appellate realm, the cases that appear to warrant the highest level of
deference are those where the proceedings that are the subject of appellate review were most
formal, most judge-like, and in which, because the record is known and the reasons have been
contemporaneously stated, there is least occasion to probe the deliberations of the subordinate
tribunal. In the parlance of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, this category includes
judicial review of both on the record adjudication and on the record rulemaking of a kind
that now includes rate making like that in Morgan.
The case for deference is somewhat weaker when the entry-level federal court sits in an
appellate capacity and reviews executive action involving the kind of informal adjudication
that gave rise to the decision in Overton Park. There is no requirement that the decision be
made on the basis of an exclusive record, that it be made after a formal hearing, or that it
be accompanied by a formal statement of reasons. Here, where the occasion and need may
be stronger, the Court has shown a higher readiness to permit a litigant to probe deliberative
processes.
The remaining subcategory of appellate proceedings are those in which the federal court sits
in judicial review of notice and comment rulemaking. Here, the court's deference, and the
attendant limits on its willingness to probe the executive's decisional process and to substitute
its judgment for that executive, may be understood either in terms of the deference that a
higher court shows to a lower one, or in terms of the deference that a court will, under certain
circumstances, show to a legislature. If it is the latter that is at work, then we would appear
to be dealing with an occasion for deference that ought to be dealt with on its own terms and
not in the quasi-judicial terms of Morgan. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) (restraint in probing "legislative or
executive motivation"); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (restraint in
probing deliberations related to notice and comment rulemaking). In either event, we are
dealing with a "specific" occasion for judicial deference which, if it actually warrants deference,
removes these cases from the realm of the general deliberative privilege.
Thus, within the appellate arena, we find a number of important differences that bear upon
the strength of the executive's claim for deference. We also find that the Morgan case involves
one of those sets of circumstances in which we would expect the courts to afford the highest
level of deference. Under other circumstances, the Supreme Court has shown lower levels of
deference.
The larger point, of course, is that there is a significant volume of litigation involving the
federal executive that falls entirely outside this appellate arena. Occasionally one hears it said
that adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act is a residual category and that
adjudication and rulemaking, taken together, encompass the entire range of executive action.
Such statements may be plausible in light of the definitions contained in the federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988), and in light of the fact that everything a
court does could be characterized as the judicial "review" of someone's conduct. Neither of
these semantic arguments, however, is relevant to the functional analysis by which I have
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second conclusion, and for present purposes the more important one, is
that the core rationale underlying the Morgan doctrine extends no further
than the reasonably broad arena of cases in which the entry-level federal
court sits in an appellate capacity and reviews work of what is, functionally,
a subordinate tribunal located within the executive branch.
3. Other Arguments
Here I consider three other arguments from authority that have been
offered in support of the privilege. These rest, respectively, on proposed
federal rule of evidence 509, on the Freedom of Information Act and certain
of the cases decided under that act, on sovereign immunity and on stare
decisis.
a. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509
A number of federal courts and at least one important pair of commen-
tators have found authoritative support for the general deliberative privilege
in proposed rule 509 of the Federal Rules of Evidence-despite its rejection
by Congress.236 The argument is unpersuasive in ways that are best seen
through an examination of the reasons that Weinstein and Berger offer for
paying attention to the rejected proposal.
First, they state that the proposed rules "are the culmination of three
drafts by an Advisory Committee consisting of judges, practicing lawyers
and academicians," of "seven years of work," and of "hundreds of
suggestions received in response to the circulation of the drafts throughout
the legal community. ' 2 7 That was, as has already been shown, simply not
the case with regard to proposed rule 509. In the only two drafts of that
rule that were circulated for public comment, the Advisory Committee
clearly expressed its judgment that the government ought not enjoy a general
deliberative privilege. The basic language approving the privilege was written
not by the Committee but by the Department of Justice that was preoccupied
with defending the Nixon Presidency against the rising tide of Watergate.
proposed to set the outer boundary of Morgan. In the end, there is nevertheless an important
functional difference between the courts' "appellate" review in a case like Overton Park and
its "non-appellate" consideration of a Title VII case brought against the federal government.
236. In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp. at 580 (though never enacted, proposed rule 509 'remains
a useful guide and standard') (quoting United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1298
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), revd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978)); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BEROER, supra note 3, 501[03], at 501-32 (Supp. 1989); J. WENsTmN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL 18.01 at 18-5 (rejected rule "codifications" of the existing
law in the federal courts; 509 particularly useful as black letter law), 18.05[01], at 18-45
(509 "a useful guide for assessing privilege claims since it substantially codified previous
practice in the federal courts").
237. 2 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 501103], at 501-32 (Supp. 1989).
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The rule was then adopted by a resistant Advisory Committee only as a
result of heavy-handed political coercion.23s
Weinstein and Berger next argue that the proposed rules carry authority
because they were "adopted by the Supreme Court by an eight to one
vote." z 9 This argument is considerably overdrawn. It suggests that the
Supreme Court sat in judgment of the merits of the particular rules and
that only one Justice disapproved of the merits of those rules. In fact, the
Court did not consider the merits of particular rules2 and the one dissent
was on the ground that the Court's involvement in the rule-making process
would give people the unwarranted impression that the Court had exercised
its substantive judgment. 241
Finally, we are told that the rejected rules are useful authority because
they accurately state the law, and that Congress rejected it not on grounds
related to the substance of the rule but for reasons of political expediency. 242
That may be true of some of the rejected rules but it is not true of rule
509. Rule 509 clearly misstated existing law in at least three ways-all of
which dramatically advantaged the executive. 243 Moreover, it was rejected
for reasons that had everything to do with its substance.2A4 Under these
circumstances, there is simply no good reason to conclude that proposed
rule 509 should be understood as providing authoritative support for the
general deliberative privilege.
238. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
239. 2 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 501[03], at 501-32 (Supp. 1989).
240. In his dissent to the order transmitting the rules, Justice Douglas explained that:
[Tihis Court does not write the Rules, nor supervise their writing, nor appraise
them on their merits, weighing the pros and cons. The Court concededly is a
mere conduit. Those who write the Rules are members of a Committee named
by the Judicial Conference. The members are eminent; but they are the sole
judges of the merits of the proposed Rules, our approval being merely perfunc-
tory. In other words, we are merely the conduit to Congress.
Order, 56 F.R.D. 184, 185 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242. 2 J. WEINSTEN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 501[03], at 501-33 (Supp. 1989).
243. First, it adopted exemption five to the Freedom of Information Act as a codification
of the privilege. This is not only without judicial precedent, it is also nonsensical. Second, it
expanded the privilege by granting the government, in addition to the right to withhold
evidence, the right to prevent others from providing information related to the deliberative
process. Finally, it eliminated the requirement that the privilege must be claimed by the head
of the agency and replaced it with a provision that allowed the privilege to be asserted "by
any attorney representing the government." Fed. R. Evid. 509, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251-52 (1972)
(rejected by Congress 1973).
Each of these provisions was a major departure from the law previously established by the
courts. So major, in fact, that I have not been able to find a single court that accepted any
of these rules. Indeed, there is even some doubt as to whether the executive ever dared to ask
a court to accept these rules.
244. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:845
GENERAL DELIBERATIVE PRIVILEGE
b. The Freedom of Information Act
The proponents of the general deliberative privilege have sometimes argued
that "Congress expressly approved this ... privilege"' 45 when it enacted
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) subject to exemption five for
certain "inter-agency or intra-agency" documents.2 They have also argued
that authority for the approval of the privilege can be found in judicial
decisions applying FOIA exemptions. 7
The first problem with this argument is that exemption five is not, by its
terms, a statement about the general deliberative privilege. If, as often
seems to be assumed, exemption five incorporated only the general delib-
erative privilege, this might not be the case. But as it is, exemption five
incorporates a long list of privileges available to the government including
the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, the Morgan doctrine
and the privilege for presidential deliberations. Under these circumstances,
245. Green, 556 F. Supp. at 84.
246. Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) for "clear expression of congressional policy to hold the line on
disclosure of [deliberative] materials"; treating policy as binding; and making same error
regarding investigative privilege); Green, 556 F. Supp. at 85 ("Congress expressly approved
this common law [general deliberative] privilege when it passed the FOIA by exempting these
types of documents from disclosure in subsection (b)(5)"); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of
Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414, 416 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (Mobil Oil I1) (evidentiary privilege based on
citations to FOIA cases); Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974) (Black
1) (executive privilege based on exemption to FOIA); Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49
F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Ky. 1969) (treating FOIA as establishing the law of discovery); see also
Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (relationship
between FOIA and civil discovery-FOIA is the floor); Washington Post Co. v. United States
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explaining relationship
between FOIA and civil discovery); Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1015-16 & n.45 (D.
Del. 1975) (while FOIA exemption five in no way affects the scope of materials discoverable
in plenary civil actions, cases construing that act are "readily analogous" to cases involving
assertions of the executive privilege during civil discovery; individual need is relevant in
discovery but not under FOIA).
247. See, e.g., Branch, 638 F.2d at 873 (relying upon exemption five of FOIA); see also
McClelland, 606 F.2d at 1278; Mobil Oil II, 520 F. Supp. at 414; In re Franklin, 478 F. Supp.
at 577; Sprague Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. at 966.
248. By its terms, exemption five excludes from the general obligation of disclosure all
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(5) (1988).
This language incorporates the following judicial privileges that are not otherwise incorporated
into the design of the Act:
(1) the attorney-client privilege;
(2) the qualified protection for attorney work product;
(3) the privilege for presidential deliberations;
(4) the Morgan doctrine and its privilege for quasi-judicial deliberations;
(5) the general deliberative privilege;
(6) the government privilege against the premature disclosure of information
which would impair the government's ability to implement its policies or decisions
(the privilege against the premature disclosure of negotiating positions or the
future open-market activities of the federal reserve bank); and
(7) the privilege for information that has been communicated to the government
under promises or expectations of confidentiality.
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there is no justification for reading this exemption as a message from
Congress on the particular subject of the general deliberative privilege.
Moreover, even if Congress had singled out the general deliberative privilege
for incorporation into FOIA, congressional judgment that the deliberative
rationale warrants an exemption from a public information statute does not
entail the judgment that it warrants a judicial privilege. The reason is that,
at least as a general matter, granting disclosure through FOIA is much
more likely, in comparison to a judicial privilege, to result in the kind of
routine, systematic disclosure that is most likely to cause chilling. Moreover,
there are fewer interests favoring disclosure under FOIA than there are in
a lawsuit.
The second problem with the FOIA argument is that exemption five is
not a statement of approval but, instead, a statement of incorporation.
Moreover, it is a statement of incorporation that is expressly subject to the
possibility of modification or elimination by the courts. Thus, Congress has
spoken in such a way that its message automatically incorporates any change
of mind that the courts might have regarding any of the privileges incor-
porated through exemption five. Under these circumstances, there is no
basis for the claim that Congress has expressed the substantive view that
the courts ought to take some particular position-in this case, continued
approval-with regard to one of the incorporated privilegesY 9
The third problem is that, as a practical matter, Congress had no choice
but to make the statement it did about the governmental privileges incor-
porated by exemption five. Had it done anything else, it would have brought
chaos to the law of judicial privileges and pretrial discovery in litigation
involving the government. If, for instance, the Congress had omitted ex-
emption five, parties in litigation against the government would stop seeking
documents through pre-trial discovery and would proceed instead through
collateral actions brought under FOIA. The Morgan doctrine, the Nixon
doctrine and the government's attorney-client privilege would continue to
be the law in name only. Through their collateral FOIA actions, the opposing
parties would secure all the documents that come within the "protection"
249. It is ironic that the case for the general deliberative privilege as an exemption to FOIA
is somewhat stronger than the case for this privilege as an exception to the general obligation
to produce materials in the course of litigation. This marginal difference exists because FOIA
raises the possibility, not generally present in litigation, that someone might put in place a
standing, continuing request for all documents of a particular kind. Under these circumstances,
the argument that the possibility of disclosure may "chill" future communications seems
somewhat stronger under the law of FOIA than under the law of judicial privilege.
It is nevertheless clear that Congress chose to make the scope of FOIA depend upon the
decisions that are made within the law of judicial privilege. There is no warrant for putting
the cart before the horse in the name of what Congress might reasonably have chosen to do.
Their decision was clear: the scope of FOIA is dependent on the law of judicial privilege and
the courts are under no obligation to shape the law of judicial privilege to give, or to avoid
giving, particular meaning to FOIA.
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of those privileges. The procedural table would be steeply tilted and gov-
ernment litigators would be in a position of nearly hopeless disadvantage.
Thus, Congress may have done what it did with regard to exemption five
not because it thought especially well of the general deliberative privilege
but because, as a practical matter, there was nothing else to be done.
Finally, it has been argued that judicial decisions under exemption five
of FOIA, particularly the Supreme Court's decisions in EPA v. Mink2 0 and
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.2' constitute authoritative approval of the
general deliberative privilege. This argument fails on two counts. First, it
fails to account for the distinction between cases in which higher courts are
acting under a statutory mandate to apply a privilege that unquestionably
exists in the lower courts and other cases in which a higher court might be
asked to approve or disapprove such a privilege. 2  Cases arising under
exemption five are of the first, but not the second sort. Second, this
argument fails because it relies upon a misreading of those Supreme Court
decisions.25
250. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
251. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
252. Granting that exemption five incorporates the privilege as it exists, there remains a
crucial difference between what courts do when, on the one hand, they are asked to apply
this privilege as a rule incorporated into FOIA and, on the other hand, they are asked to
consider it as a straight-up rule of judicial privilege.
When this privilege comes before the Supreme Court as a rule of judicial privilege, rather
than as a rule of privilege that has been incorporated into some other body of law, the Court
will be confronted with two questions. The first will be whether the proponent of the privilege
is right in her assertion that there is authority for the existence of this privilege in the law of
the lower federal courts. The second will be whether under all the circumstances the Supreme
Court is warranted in granting its approval to the privilege.The question facing a FOIA court is, however, much narrower and much less relevant to
our present analysis. The only question of interest to such a court is the existence and scope
of the privilege as it may already exist. The job of a FOIA court is to apply the law of a
particular privilege, not to make it. Even if the court in question is the Supreme Court and
even if it has never before had the opportunity to approve or disapprove of the general
deliberative privilege, a FOIA case presents only the question of whether there is a general
deliberative privilege. Unlike cases that may arise directly out of the law of judicial privilege,
a FOIA case simply does not present the question of whether there ought to be such a
privilege.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court lacks the capacity to volunteer its views on the
general deliberative privilege in the course of rendering a decision under FOIA. It is, instead,
simply to say that there is reason for it not to do so. One reason, usually sufficient without
more, is that the question is not presented. Another is that the circumstances and interests
surrounding the application of FOIA are different from those surrounding the application of
a judicial privilege qua privilege. Thus, interests that are central to the law of privilege are
not even represented in a FOIA case. And, finally, the general deliberative privilege actually
makes more sense as an exemption to FOIA than it does as a part of the rules of evidence.
253. Mink, 410 U.S. at 73, is the first of the Supreme Court's FOIA decisions that is
sometimes asserted to constitute Supreme Court approval of the general deliberative privilege.
That action was brought by members of Congress who sought certain documents related to
underground nuclear explosions. The Supreme Court found that the documents were exempt
from disclosure under the Act because they were either classified secret, thus coming within
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In sum, there is simply nothing that Congress did in passing the FOIA
or that the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have done in applying the
Act that can fairly stand as authority for the proposition that there ought
to be a general deliberative privilege.
c. Sovereign Immunity
One of the first arguments that was offered in support of the general
deliberative privilege was Justice Reed's reliance, in Kaiser, on the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. 254 At the time, it was a plausible extension of that
doctrine. Within six months, however, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the use of sovereign immunity to limit the scope of discovery. Thus, in
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 255 the Court held that when the
government consents to be sued, it agrees to play by the same rules that
apply to everybody else. 256 That is not to say that there are no evidentiary
privileges that are available only to the government. Rather, it is to say
that there are no privileges available to the government simply by virtue of
its status as "sovereign." This conclusion is consistent with the American
(but not British) idea that it is the people who are sovereign 217 and with the
exemption one, or they were "inter-agency or intra-agency" documents within the scope of
exemption five. Justice White, writing for himself and three others, argued that the lower
courts had created a general deliberative privilege, that documents coming within the scope of
that privilege came also within the scope of exemption five, and that Congress had 'intended
that incorporation.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 132, has also been cited as evidencing Supreme Court
approval of the general deliberative privilege. It does nothing of the kind. The case dealt with
Sears' demand for certain documents generated by the NLRB's Office of the General Counsel
concerning the decision whether to permit the filing of unfair labor practice complaints with
the Board. The principal question was whether those documents fell within exemption five.
The Court decided that certain of the documents were final agency decisions outside the scope
of the exemption and that others were "squarely within Exemption five's protection of an
attorney's work product." Id. at 160. Clearly neither of these elements of the decision rested
on any kind of determination that there is-much less that there ought to be-such a thing
as the general deliberative privilege.
There are only two ways in which the Sears decision may be said to speak of the deliberative
privilege. First, the Court recites the fact that the government expressly asked it to rest its
decision on Kaiser and "the 'generally ... recognized' privilege for 'confidential intra-agency
advisory opinions ....' Id. at 149 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946). This,
quite clearly, the Court declined to do. Second, the Court noted "[t]hat Congress had the
Government's executive privilege specifically in mind in adopting Exemption five .. . ." Id.
at 150. But its discussion of the scope of that privilege is generalized, wholly derivative and
irrelevant to the decision.
254. Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 939.
255. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
256. Id.
257. The very idea that sovereign immunity could be raised as a defense to a private suit
implies (1) that the executive is sovereign and that the citizen is not, and (2) that sovereignty
resides in the executive and not in the judiciary. These positions make sense in Great Britain
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principle that sovereign immunity applies to claims for relief and not to
matters internal to the litigation of permissible claims. 258 It therefore seems
but not in the United States.
The difference between the United States and Great Britain with regard to the applicability
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been clearly expressed by the Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding the progress which has been made since the days of the Stuarts
in stripping the crown of its powers and prerogatives, it remains true to-day that
the monarch is looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected to the
demands of the law as ordinary persons are, and the king-loving nation would
be shocked at the spectacle of their Queen being turned out of her pleasure
garden by a writ of ejectment .... The crown remains the fountain of honor,
and the surroundings which give dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished
and enforced all the more strictly because of the loss of real power in the
government.
It is not to be expected, therefore, that the courts will permit their process to
disturb the possession of the crown....
Under our system the people, who are there [in Britain] called subjects, are
the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not bound to
give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of the monarch. The citizen
here knows no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful
himself, to whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him when it
is well administered.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (concerning the availability of suits against
government officers and agents); see also Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (English practice regarding sovereign immunity); C. WmGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAl. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3654, at 200 (2d ed. 1987) (English concept
that the king can do no wrong "seems very inconsistent with the democratic principle of
popular sovereignty prevailing in the United States").
Compare for instance the law of Procter & Gamble with the explanation of English law
that Kaiser quotes from Duncan. In the United States the government is, "of course, subject
to the rules of discovery." Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681. But in England, "[t]he law is
that the Crown is entitled to full discovery, and that the subject as against the Crown is not.
That is the prerogative of the Crown.... ." Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 945 (quoting
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] App. Cas. 624).
258. Moreover, it is a doctrine that has no application to matters of discovery and privilege.
It applies to claims for relief, not to the rules according to which litigation is conducted.
Absent a statutory waiver, it bars:
(1) Lawsuits against the government for monetary and non-monetary relief. It
is well established that the United States may not be sued without its consent.
C. WRImHT, A. MmuER & E. COOPER, supra note 257, § 3654, at 186 & n.2.
There are three principal statutes that waive sovereign immunity and grant subject
matter jurisdiction for suits against the federal government. The Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1982), and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1982), establish and regulate the government's monetary liability. The
Administrative Procedure Act provides for actions for non-monetary relief through
judicial review of certain types of federal conduct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 702 (1982) (1976
amendment permits suits against the government), 701(a) (precludes judicial review
where such preclusion is embodied in another statute or where the injuries action
is committed by law to agency discretion).
(2) Counterclaims and cross-claims against the government. The rule with
regard to counterclaims against the United States is that "in an action instituted
by the government a counterclaim, like any other claim against the United States,
can be interposed only when the government has waived its immunity from suit
or that claim." 6 C. WIGHr & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1426, at 138; see
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entirely reasonable that no one is now arguing that this privilege is authorized
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Anew, 423
F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1970). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(d) reaffirms this
rule by providing that the counterclaim provisions of the civil rules shall not be
read to extend a party's right to sue the United States beyond the limits established
by statute. Thus, it is clear that the limitation on counterclaims that arises from
the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not mean that there is one set of federal
rules for non-governmental parties and another for the government. It simply
reflects the fact that the possibility of a counterclaim under the civil rules does
not, absent the kind of express statutory waiver that is always required, eliminate
the jurisdictional defense of sovereign immunity.
(3) And claims for particular items of relief including:
(a) Interest. It is clearly established that "in the absence of express
congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general
waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest
award." Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986) (denying
award of interest on statutory attorney's fees under Title VII); United
States v. Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951); United States v. New York
Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 658 (1947); Smyth v. United States,
302 U.S. 329 (1937) (recognizing an exception to the general rule where
the suit is brought under the takings provision of the fifth amendment);
Tillson v. United States, 100 U.S. 43 (1879). But see United States v. The
Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924) (awarding interest); United States v. McKee,
91 U.S. 442, 450-51 (1876) (awarding interest; if "[t]he claim is one which
the government has by law agreed to pay, we see no reason why it should
not be paid in full, with all its legal incidents ....").
What is of interest for purposes of this article is the fact that "[t]his
requirement of a separate waiver reflects the historical view that interest
is an element of damages separate from damages on the substantive claim."
Library of Congress, 478 U.S. at 314; see also Note, Interest in Judgments
Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation, 91
YALE L.J. 297, 300 n.18, 302-03, 307 (1981) (interest originally a penalty,
a separate remedy for a separate injury). Thus, interest is barred by
sovereign immunity "unless the government consented not only to liability
for the underlying substantive claim but also to liability for the additional
wrong addressed by an award of interest." Id. at 303. It is therefore plain
that, for purposes of the application of sovereign immunity, a claim for
interest is a claim for relief in the same sense in which the substantive
claim for compensation or a claim for punitive damages is a claim for the
award of relief.
(b) Costs. 14 C. WRoIGr, A. MILLR & E. COOPER, supra note 257, §
3654.
(c) Attorney's fees. Id. § 3654, at 192-93 ("The rule requiring consent
applies not only to the general subject of the suit but also to specific items
of award, particularly the award of attorney's fees.") Prior to the enact-
ment of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988), the Court
had consistently held that an award of attorney's fees had to be based on
an express waiver of sovereign immunity. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680 (1983) (awards of attorney's fees against the U.S. "are generally
prohibited by the express assertion of sovereign immunity found in 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 11 1978)"); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-68 (1975); and cases cited in C. WIGH-, A.




Finally, one might grant everything that has been said to this point and
conclude, on grounds of stare decisis, that the privilege ought to continue
to exist for no other reason than that it has been applied by dozens upon
dozens of lower federal courts. 9 This argument is weak in several ways.
First, the general deliberative privilege is a matter, not of substantive law,
but of the "adjective" law that governs the way the court handles its own
business. As such, it belongs to a class of rules in which our interest in
stability is particularly low, the freedom accorded to the courts is particularly
high, and claims of stare decisis are particularly weak. ° Second, the
argument for stare decisis is relatively weak because what I am proposing
is a reconsideration of the privilege in light of a number of arguments and
Federal Practice Digest, United States key 147. Section 2412 of the Judicial
Code provided statutory authority for a "judgment of costs" against the
United States, but that provision was clear in excluding "the fees and
expenses of attorneys" from the authorized award. The result was a
situation in which attorney's fees-available against other litigants under
rare exceptions to the "American rule"-were never available against the
government unless explicitly authorized by statute.
In 1981, § 2412 was amended by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5
U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2512 (1988), by which the government gives
up its special treatment and agrees to be subject to the award of attorney's
fees under the established exceptions to the American rule.
d) Punitive Damages. It is expressly provided under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA) that the United States "shall not be liable... for
punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). It is also customary to say
that punitive damages against the government are barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, citing this provision of the FTCA not as a statutory
prohibition upon punitive damages but, instead, as the explicit withholding
of a waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, the FTCA is read as waiving
sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government but not for
claims for punitive damages. See, e.g., Hunt, 636 F.2d at 584; Ferrero v.
United States, 603 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. United States,
547 F.2d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1976); Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 866 (1975); Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
It does not apply to matters internal to the litigation of permissible claims. See, e.g., Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 681; cases cited in 8 C. WRIGanr & A. Miumm, supra note 3, §
2019 n.65 (Supp. 1988).
While the law does not provide a right to a jury trial against the government, it is a
manifestation of the seventh amendment not of sovereign immunity. There is, in other words,
no seventh amendment right to a jury trial against the government because the seventh
amendment applies only to "suits at common law" and because there is no such thing as a
"suit at common law" against the government, not because the sovereign is "immune" from
jury trials. 9 C. WimGHT & A. MII=R, supra note 3, § 2314, at 68-69.
259. See, e.g., Branch, 638 F.2d at 873; McClelland, 606 F.2d at 1278. The one district
court case most frequently cited is Carl Zeiss Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 318.




alternatives that the courts have not previously considered. 261 Finally, the
stare decisis argument is weak because the cases that have approved this
privilege have been, on their own terms, wrongly decided. M Thus, to one
degree or another, they have rested upon a series of mistakes concerning
the history of the privilege, the instrumental interests involved, the alter-
natives available, and the force of the arguments from authority that have
been offered by the proponents of the privilege.
4. Summary
The "arguments from authority" that are offered on behalf of the general
deliberative privilege are of two general kinds. Some involve the claim that
the privilege must exist because of the requirements of some body of law
that is external to the law of evidence-the Constitution, for instance-
while others involve reliance upon someone else's prior approval of the
privilege qua privilege.
The arguments from authority external to the law of evidence include
those that rely on the separation of powers, the Morgan doctrine in
administrative law and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Each of these
are unpersuasive in that they depend upon a misunderstanding or misap-
plication of the doctrines invoked. Moreover, as suggested above,2 3 the
proponents of the privilege have failed to establish the instrumental predi-
cates-i.e., the injury to the public interest-that might warrant the expan-
sion of any of these doctrines to include the general deliberative privilege.
The arguments based on someone else's prior approval of the privilege
all entail the claim that the questions that are relevant within the law of
evidence have already been asked and answered. Here, the proponents of
the privilege point to decisions of the British House of Lords and the Court
of Claims, to the congressional enactment and judicial application of the
Freedom of Information Act, to proposed rule 509 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and to the now considerable accumulation of lower federal court
decisions involving the privilege.
These arguments, too, are unpersuasive. The House of Lords and the
Court of Claims have, indeed, approved the privilege. But, given the
fundamental differences between both of those arenas and the federal district
courts, it simply does not follow that their approval of this privilege might
be justification for its adoption in the district courts. At the same time, the
claims concerning the Freedom of Information Act and proposed evidence
rule 509 are unpersuasive because in neither of these cases was there an
261. See generally id.
262. See generally id.
263. See supra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
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approval of the general deliberative privilege. Finally, the stare decisis claim
in this case is too weak to justify the perpetuation of an otherwise unwar-
ranted privilege.
CONCLUSION
The general deliberative privilege has been adopted by the federal courts
without full and careful scrutiny. Careful examination reveals that the
privilege rests on a series of arguments that have been accepted as compelling
but that, in fact, are incomplete and unpersuasive. These include claims
concerning the history of the privilege, its instrumental effects and a variety
of potentially controlling legal doctrines.
One might respond to these circumstances in a number of different ways.
For example, one might look more closely and conclude that this Article's
statement of the situation is mistaken and that the arguments on behalf of
the privilege are, in fact, fully persuasive. Beyond that, there are five
options. First, one might accept this Article's statement of the deficiencies
in the instrumental argument but then somehow remedy those deficiencies,
thereby strengthening the argument and rendering it sufficient. Second, one
might note that the privilege is a qualified one and tinker with the decisional
apparatus by which individual judges apply it in particular cases. Third,
one might concede that there is no legal doctrine that now warrants the
privilege, but conclude that some doctrine ought to be extended to warrant
the privilege. Fourth, one might conclude that for some reason the weak-
nesses of the arguments in favor of this privilege are either not relevant to
or not dispositive of the question whether there ought to be a privilege.
Or, fifth, one might abandon the privilege until the case in its favor is
convincingly made. I shall leave to others the rich possibility of proving my
criticism to be unjustified and consider, in turn, each of the other possible
responses.
The first of these possibilities involves granting the deficiencies in the
instrumental argument offered in favor of the privilege and then curing
those deficiencies, presumably through some kind of empirical evidence that
disclosure has the bad effects that are asserted. The problem with this
approach is that it seems unlikely that a full and persuasive showing will
ever be made. The question that must be answered is not whether the risk
of disclosure can cause chilling but whether this particular risk of disclosure
will cause such chilling as is, after everything has been taken into account,
contrary to the public interest. This question requires us to take account of
a range of factors that diminish the force of the argument in favor of the
privilege. These factors include the contingency of the risk of disclosure,
the presumption that she-who-might-be-chilled is reasonable both in her
firmness and in her commitment to her job, and that she faces incentives
to speak that operate to offset the disincentives associated with the risk of
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disclosure. They also include the fact that the chilling of some (e.g., corrupt)
communications is beneficial, that disclosure brings certain benefits associ-
ated with higher levels of openness and accountability, and that granting a
privilege will have adverse effects on the judiciary, on presumably worthy
litigants, on the supposedly sovereign citizenry, and, in those ways, on the
possibilities of justice and democracy. And, finally, there are alternative
means of protecting the executive's asserted interest that carry a lower cost
to the public interest than does granting the privilege. It is my judgment
that the deficiencies in the instrumental case in favor of this privilege cannot
and will not be cured. Not because it is hard to devise the necessary tests,
though that is certainly true. But rather, because the case is just not strong
enough.
Moving to the second option. one might try to salvage the instrumental
case in favor of this privilege by asking individual judges to distinguish
between those cases in which the deliberative rationale is strong from those
in which it is not. This is, after all, a qualified privilege and one might
simply tinker with the decisional apparatus by which individual judges
balance interests in individual cases. The difficulty with this approach is
that, in working their way through these problems, the courts have shown
themselves to be capable of distinguishing between those documents that
are important to the litigation and those that are not, but not of distin-
guishing the relative strength, in particular cases, of the deliberative ration-
ale. They have invariably taken that rationale to be fully established. Even
if the courts were willing and able to establish a decisional process that
actually tested the strength of the deliberative rationale, there is no evidence
that anything would be gained by considering that question on a case-by-
case basis. There are two reasons for this statement. One is that there is
no evidence that occasional disclosure in the course of judicial proceedings
will ever cause injury to the public interest, particularly in light of the other
means by which we can all but eliminate the risk of chilling. The second is
that there is no reason to believe that the strength of the deliberative
rationale depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
Apart from the possibilities of filling the gaps in the instrumental argu-
ment or fixing the problem by tinkering with the decisional process that the
judges follow in individual cases, a third response to my argument would
be to conclude that existing doctrine ought to be extended to support the
general deliberative privilege. Here we assume that neither the Morgan nor
the Nixon cases can be read as requiring a lower court to honor the general
deliberative privilege, but conclude that the privilege ought to be warranted
by an extension of one of those doctrines. The problem with this approach
is that there exists no strong argument in favor of that doctrinal extension.
If the separation of powers doctrine does not currently warrant the general
deliberative privilege but ought to be extended so that it does, we must
offer some reason other than the separation of powers itself. That other
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reason would, presumably, involve a demonstration of instrumental effects.
But I have already concluded that a compelling demonstration of instru-
mental effects cannot be made. If the doctrine of separation of powers
does not now require the granting of a general deliberative privilege, there
is also no convincing argument as to why that doctrine should be extended
to warrant that privilege.
The fourth possibility, that we are setting too high a standard when we
reject the privilege on the ground that the case in its favor is weak, is not
persuasive. Would it not, for instance, be more reasonable to place the
burden on those who want to permit discovery against the government?
Under this approach, the fact that the case in favor of the privilege might
be unpersuasive would not lead to abandonment of the privilege. Or, in
any event, it would not be dispositive.
There are, in fact, two perspectives from which we could approach this
problem. Each is mutually exclusive of the other and-what is more inter-
esting-each is clear, familiar and perfectly coherent. Under the first of
these perspectives, we should plainly err on the side of nondisclosure. The
government's administrative personnel are presumed to be competent, fair-
minded, committed to serving the public interest, and disinclined toward
corruption or political chicanery. Litigation is viewed as an intrusion upon
the process of governance. We are disinclined to interfere with the admin-
istration's exercise of its responsibilities and we take at face value the
government's assertion that disclosure will disserve the public interest.
From the other perspective, we should clearly err on the side of openness
and accountability. We are distrustful of the administrative apparatus and
view it as potentially antidemocratic and likely to be dominated by special
interests. Sovereignty ought to reside in the people. There is little reverence
for the expertise and fair-mindedness of administrators. Openness and
accountability are necessary to prevent the corruption or distortion of the
public interest. The Freedom of Information Act is a good idea and ought
to be broadly construed. Far from being an unwanted interference, litigation
is an important tool in the kit-bag of democracy. Moreover, in the spirit
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, broad discovery is the all but
inalienable right of those who litigate, particularly those who litigate against
powerful adversaries. Another litigant's boilerplate claim that discovery
ought to be denied because of the harm it will cause is certainly not to be
taken at face value.
On the matter of the general deliberative privilege, it is not now possible
to reconcile these two positions.3 But the task of resolving the conflict
264. The controversy would presumably end if we were to prove the certainty of the
arguments that comprise the case against the privilege (e.g., that the risk of disclosure in the
course of litigation does not cause chilling). But if the proof went the other way and chilling
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between the predispositions associated with these different perspectives is,
in fact, fairly straight-forward because there is a clearly applicable rule of
decision. This rule assigns to the proponents of a judicial privilege the
burden of proving that the privilege is justified. Moreover, this rule applies
equally to qualified and absolute privileges. Thus, though the proponents
of this privilege might prefer to err on the side of secrecy and to give the
executive the benefit of the doubt, the law of evidence stands clearly in
their way. In theory, they could argue that this decisional rule does not, or
ought not, apply. Such an argument has not been made and, even if it
were, it would be extremely difficult to sustain.
It has been taken for granted that the federal executive ought to enjoy
the protections of the general deliberative privilege. That privilege has been
supported by a wide range of arguments based on history, instrumental
effects and legal doctrine. On close examination, however, these arguments
have proven to be incomplete, unpersuasive and sometimes simply wrong.
The case in favor of the general deliberative privilege has not been made
and, it seems fair to conclude, cannot be made. Under these circumstances,
it seems that the only reasonable and appropriate course is to abandon the
privilege.
was shown to be a serious problem, a trade-off would still be required between administrative
efficiency on the one hand and, on the other hand, accountability, citizen sovereignty, justice
in the individual case, and the even-handed treatment of litigants. Even perfect knowledge
concerning the effects of the privilege could not eliminate controversy over the relative weight
to be assigned to those competing interests. This problem is, of course, substantially com-
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